AHTeamEPProtector03fakePESHiELD2xFEUERRADER

Hunt Hypothesis

This rule identifies the presence of the AHTeamEPProtector03fakePESHiELD2xFEUERRADER YARA signature, which likely indicates a specific malware implant or custom tooling used for endpoint protection or evasion. Proactively hunting for this signature allows the SOC to detect low-severity, potentially stealthy adversary artifacts that may be persisting in memory or on disk before they escalate to more impactful post-exploitation activities.

YARA Rule

rule AHTeamEPProtector03fakePESHiELD2xFEUERRADER
{
      meta:
		author="malware-lu"
strings:
		$a0 = { 90 [46] 90 FF E0 60 E8 00 00 00 00 41 4E 41 4B 49 4E 5D 83 ED 06 EB 02 EA 04 }

condition:
		$a0 at pe.entry_point
}

Deployment Notes

This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:

• Microsoft Defender for Endpoint — Custom indicators / advanced hunting
• Email Gateway — Attachment scanning
• File Share Monitoring — Periodic scanning of shared drives
• YARA CLI — Manual threat hunting on endpoints

This rule contains 1 string patterns in its detection logic.

• Source Rule

False Positive Guidance

• Scenario: A developer or DevOps engineer is testing a custom .NET application that mimics the structure of the fakePESHiELD2xFEUERRADER binary (e.g., for unit testing or integration with a legacy C# library) on a build server or a specific developer workstation. The YARA rule matches the specific string or structural pattern of the test binary.

  • Filter/Exclusion: Exclude files located in standard development directories (e.g., C:\Users\<User>\source\repos\, C:\dev\, C:\builds\) or exclude processes running under specific development service accounts (e.g., svc-build, dev-team) when the parent process is a known IDE or build tool (e.g., devenv.exe, msbuild.exe, dotnet.exe).

• Scenario: A security team is performing a controlled “purple team” exercise or a vulnerability scan using a tool like Sysmon or a custom EDR agent that loads a test module named fakePEShiELD2xFEUERRADER.dll to verify detection coverage. This is a legitimate, known activity during scheduled security audits.

  • Filter/Exclusion: Exclude alerts where the event occurs during a pre-defined maintenance window (e.g., Tuesday 02:00-04:00 UTC) and the parent process is a known security tool (e.g., powershell.exe running from C:\Program Files\SecurityTools\, python.exe from C:\tools\scanners\).

• Scenario: A legacy line-of-business (LOB) application, such as an old inventory management system or a specialized medical device interface, uses a custom DLL or EXE that was renamed or compiled with a similar naming convention (fakePEShiELD2xFEUERRADER.exe) due to a historical naming