This hypothesis posits that adversaries are modifying instructions on previously published AI agents to inject malicious prompts or alter logic flow, leveraging MITRE technique T1565.001 (Search for Information). A proactive hunt is essential in Azure Sentinel because unauthorized prompt changes can silently compromise data integrity and decision-making processes before traditional security controls detect the deviation.
let lookback = 14d;
let recent = 2d;
let IdentityIdtoUPN = materialize(
IdentityInfo
| extend ResolvedAccountUpn = tostring(column_ifexists("AccountUpn", column_ifexists("AccountUPN", ""))),
IdentityTimestamp = todatetime(column_ifexists("Timestamp", column_ifexists("TimeGenerated", datetime(null))))
| where IdentityTimestamp >= ago(lookback)
| where isnotempty(AccountObjectId) and isnotempty(ResolvedAccountUpn)
| summarize arg_max(IdentityTimestamp, ResolvedAccountUpn) by AccountObjectId
| project AccountObjectId = tostring(AccountObjectId), AccountUpn = ResolvedAccountUpn);
let CurrentState =
AgentsInfo
| where Timestamp > ago(recent)
| summarize arg_max(Timestamp, *) by AgentId
| where LifecycleStatus != "Deleted"
| where PublishedStatus == "Published"
| where isnotempty(Instructions) and Instructions != "N/A"
| project AgentId, Timestamp, Name, Platform, CreatedDateTime, Owners,
CurrentInstructions = Instructions;
let BaselineState =
AgentsInfo
| where Timestamp between (ago(lookback) .. ago(recent))
| where LifecycleStatus != "Deleted"
| summarize arg_max(Timestamp, *) by AgentId
| where PublishedStatus == "Published"
| where isnotempty(Instructions) and Instructions != "N/A"
| project AgentId, PreviousTimestamp = Timestamp,
PreviousInstructions = Instructions;
CurrentState
| join kind=inner BaselineState on AgentId
| where CurrentInstructions != PreviousInstructions
| extend PreviousInstructionsHash = hash_sha256(PreviousInstructions),
CurrentInstructionsHash = hash_sha256(CurrentInstructions),
InstructionsLengthDelta = strlen(CurrentInstructions) - strlen(PreviousInstructions)
| extend OwnerIds = iff(array_length(coalesce(Owners, dynamic([]))) > 0, Owners, dynamic([""]))
| mv-expand OwnerId = OwnerIds to typeof(string)
| join kind=leftouter IdentityIdtoUPN on $left.OwnerId == $right.AccountObjectId
| project-rename OwnerUpn = AccountUpn
| extend OwnerAccountName = tostring(split(OwnerUpn, "@")[0]),
OwnerAccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(OwnerUpn, "@")[1])
| project Timestamp, PreviousTimestamp, AgentId, Name, Platform, CreatedDateTime,
PreviousInstructionsHash, CurrentInstructionsHash, InstructionsLengthDelta,
OwnerId, OwnerUpn, OwnerAccountName, OwnerAccountUPNSuffix
| sort by Timestamp desc
id: 662eae7f-494f-41a8-bfef-23dd80361795
name: AI Agents - Instructions changed on previously published agent
description: |
Identifies instruction changes on AI agents that were published in both current and baseline snapshots. Review the changed prompt and audit records to confirm whether the update was authorized. Run within 2 days of a change to retain coverage.
requiredDataConnectors: []
tactics:
- Impact
relevantTechniques:
- T1565.001
query: |
let lookback = 14d;
let recent = 2d;
let IdentityIdtoUPN = materialize(
IdentityInfo
| extend ResolvedAccountUpn = tostring(column_ifexists("AccountUpn", column_ifexists("AccountUPN", ""))),
IdentityTimestamp = todatetime(column_ifexists("Timestamp", column_ifexists("TimeGenerated", datetime(null))))
| where IdentityTimestamp >= ago(lookback)
| where isnotempty(AccountObjectId) and isnotempty(ResolvedAccountUpn)
| summarize arg_max(IdentityTimestamp, ResolvedAccountUpn) by AccountObjectId
| project AccountObjectId = tostring(AccountObjectId), AccountUpn = ResolvedAccountUpn);
let CurrentState =
AgentsInfo
| where Timestamp > ago(recent)
| summarize arg_max(Timestamp, *) by AgentId
| where LifecycleStatus != "Deleted"
| where PublishedStatus == "Published"
| where isnotempty(Instructions) and Instructions != "N/A"
| project AgentId, Timestamp, Name, Platform, CreatedDateTime, Owners,
CurrentInstructions = Instructions;
let BaselineState =
AgentsInfo
| where Timestamp between (ago(lookback) .. ago(recent))
| where LifecycleStatus != "Deleted"
| summarize arg_max(Timestamp, *) by AgentId
| where PublishedStatus == "Published"
| where isnotempty(Instructions) and Instructions != "N/A"
| project AgentId, PreviousTimestamp = Timestamp,
PreviousInstructions = Instructions;
CurrentState
| join kind=inner BaselineState on AgentId
| where CurrentInstructions != PreviousInstructions
| extend PreviousInstructionsHash = hash_sha256(PreviousInstructions),
CurrentInstructionsHash = hash_sha256(CurrentInstructions),
InstructionsLengthDelta = strlen(CurrentInstructions) - strlen(PreviousInstructions)
| extend OwnerIds = iff(array_length(coalesce(Owners, dynamic([]))) > 0, Owners, dynamic([""]))
| mv-expand OwnerId = OwnerIds to typeof(string)
| join kind=leftouter IdentityIdtoUPN on $left.OwnerId == $right.AccountObjectId
| project-rename OwnerUpn = AccountUpn
| extend OwnerAccountName = tostring(split(OwnerUpn, "@")[0]),
OwnerAccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(OwnerUpn, "@")[1])
| project Timestamp, PreviousTimestamp, AgentId, Name, Platform, CreatedDateTime,
PreviousInstructionsHash, CurrentInstructionsHash, InstructionsLengthDelta,
OwnerId, OwnerUpn, OwnerAccountName, OwnerAccountUPNSuffix
| sort by Timestamp desc
entityMappings:
- entityType: Account
fi
| Sentinel Table | Notes |
|---|---|
IdentityInfo | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
Here are 4 specific false positive scenarios for the AI Agents - Instructions changed on previously published agent detection rule, tailored for an enterprise environment:
Automated Knowledge Base Synchronization via CI/CD Pipelines
initiating_user is the service account (e.g., svc-cicd-deploy) and the source_ip matches the internal CI/CD subnet, provided the change timestamp falls within the defined maintenance window (01:00–04:00 UTC).Scheduled Seasonal Context Updates by Platform Admins
AI-Platform-Admins group where the change_description field contains keywords such as “Seasonal Update,” “Q4 Refresh,” or references a specific Change Request ID (e.g., matching regex CR-[0-9]{6}).Automated Compliance Policy Injection