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Amsi.DLL Loaded Via LOLBIN Process

sigma MEDIUM SigmaHQ
DeviceImageLoadEvents
This rule was pulled from an open-source repository and enriched with AI. Validate in a test environment before deploying to production.
View original rule at SigmaHQ →
Retrieved: 2026-03-25T03:05:59Z · Confidence: medium

Hunt Hypothesis

Adversaries may use the Amsi.DLL via a LOLBIN process to evade detection and execute malicious code. SOC teams should proactively hunt for this behavior in Azure Sentinel to identify potential stealthy malware execution attempts.

Detection Rule

Sigma (Original)

title: Amsi.DLL Loaded Via LOLBIN Process
id: 6ec86d9e-912e-4726-91a2-209359b999b9
status: test
description: Detects loading of "Amsi.dll" by a living of the land process. This could be an indication of a "PowerShell without PowerShell" attack
references:
    - Internal Research
    - https://www.paloaltonetworks.com/blog/security-operations/stopping-powershell-without-powershell/
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-06-01
modified: 2025-10-07
tags:
    - attack.defense-evasion
logsource:
    category: image_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        ImageLoaded|endswith: '\amsi.dll'
        Image|endswith:
            # TODO: Add more interesting processes
            - '\ExtExport.exe'
            - '\odbcconf.exe'
            # - '\regsvr32.exe' # legitimately calls amsi.dll
            - '\rundll32.exe'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: medium

KQL (Microsoft 365 Defender)

DeviceImageLoadEvents
| where FolderPath endswith "\\amsi.dll" and (InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\ExtExport.exe" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\odbcconf.exe" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\rundll32.exe")

False Positive Guidance

MITRE ATT&CK Context

Original source: https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/image_load/image_load_dll_amsi_suspicious_process.yml