AntiDote 1214 SE DLL SIS Team additional

Hunt Hypothesis

This rule detects the presence of specific DLL artifacts associated with the AntiDote 1214 SE SIS Team, indicating potential lateral movement or privilege escalation activities often employed by adversaries to maintain persistence within domain environments. Proactively hunting for these indicators allows the SOC team to identify compromised hosts early, as these specific binary components are frequently used in targeted attacks to manipulate system services or inject code into trusted processes.

YARA Rule

rule AntiDote_1214_SE_DLL_SIS_Team_additional: PEiD
{
    strings:
        $a = { EB 10 66 62 3A 43 2B 2B 48 4F 4F 4B 90 E9 08 32 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 80 7C 24 08 01 0F 85 ?? ?? ?? ?? 60 BE ?? ?? ?? ?? 8D BE ?? ?? ?? ?? 57 83 CD FF EB 0B 90 8A 06 46 88 07 47 01 DB 75 07 8B 1E 83 EE FC 11 DB 72 ED B8 01 00 00 00 01 DB 75 07 8B 1E 83 EE FC 11 DB 11 C0 01 DB 73 ?? 75 ?? 8B 1E 83 EE FC 11 DB }
    condition:
        $a at pe.entry_point

}

Deployment Notes

This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:

• Microsoft Defender for Endpoint — Custom indicators / advanced hunting
• Email Gateway — Attachment scanning
• File Share Monitoring — Periodic scanning of shared drives
• YARA CLI — Manual threat hunting on endpoints

This rule contains 1 string patterns in its detection logic.

• Source Rule

False Positive Guidance

• Scenario: A developer or DevOps engineer compiles a custom C++ application that links against the secur32.dll (or similar security-related DLLs) and includes specific string literals or import tables that match the YARA signature. This often happens when building internal microservices or authentication proxies that explicitly reference security APIs.

  • Filter/Exclusion: Exclude files located in known development directories (e.g., C:\Users\*\AppData\Local\Temp\, C:\src\, C:\builds\) or exclude files with extensions like .obj, .lib, or .pdb if the rule targets binary artifacts. Alternatively, whitelist specific build server accounts or paths where compilation occurs.

• Scenario: An IT administrator runs a scheduled PowerShell script or a custom batch job to audit or patch security configurations, which loads the target DLL into memory or creates a temporary copy in a system temp folder (%TEMP% or C:\Windows\Temp). The YARA rule may flag the temporary copy or the in-memory module if the rule scans file paths or memory dumps.

  • Filter/Exclusion: Exclude processes or files where the parent process is powershell.exe, pwsh.exe, or cmd.exe and the file path contains \Temp\ or \tmp\. Additionally, consider excluding known administrative service accounts (e.g., svc_admin, it_ops) when the action is “File Created” or “Process Started” in the temp directories.

• Scenario: A third-party enterprise application (such as a DLP agent, EDR client, or virtualization management tool like VMware vCenter or Citrix Receiver) bundles or dynamically loads a DLL with a similar name or structure to the one targeted by the rule. This is common in complex enterprise stacks where vendors reuse generic DLL names or embed security modules.

  • **Filter