This detection identifies adversaries deploying legacy or obsolete hacking toolsets, such as the disclosed asp4.txt artifact, which may indicate reconnaissance activities or the use of known, potentially vulnerable utilities within the environment. Proactive hunting for these artifacts in Azure Sentinel is critical to uncover dormant threats that evade standard signature-based defenses and to assess whether these “old” tools represent a deliberate attempt by attackers to blend into existing infrastructure noise.
rule aspbackdoor_asp4 {
meta:
description = "Disclosed hacktool set (old stuff) - file asp4.txt"
author = "Florian Roth"
date = "23.11.14"
score = 60
hash = "faf991664fd82a8755feb65334e5130f791baa8c"
strings:
$s0 = "system.dll" fullword ascii
$s2 = "set sys=server.CreateObject (\"system.contral\") " fullword ascii
$s3 = "Public Function reboot(atype As Variant)" fullword ascii
$s4 = "t& = ExitWindowsEx(1, atype)" ascii
$s5 = "atype=request(\"atype\") " fullword ascii
$s7 = "AceiveX dll" fullword ascii
$s8 = "Declare Function ExitWindowsEx Lib \"user32\" (ByVal uFlags As Long, ByVal " ascii
$s10 = "sys.reboot(atype)" fullword ascii
condition:
all of them
}
This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:
This rule contains 8 string patterns in its detection logic.
Here are 5 specific false positive scenarios for the Disclosed hacktool set (old stuff) - file asp4.txt detection rule, including suggested filters and exclusions:
Scenario: Legacy IIS Web Application Deployment via PowerShell
asp4.txt (a legacy configuration or log artifact) to the C:\inetpub\wwwroot directory. The extraction tool (e.g., 7-Zip or WinRAR CLI) triggers a file creation event that matches the rule’s signature for “hacktool” activity involving this specific filename.powershell.exe or msiexec.exe and the destination path contains \inetpub\wwwroot\. Additionally, filter out events where the file hash matches a known baseline of the legitimate asp4.txt artifact.Scenario: Scheduled Maintenance Job for Legacy ERP System
maintenance_daily.ps1) that generates temporary log files named asp4.txt in the application’s data directory (D:\ERP_Data\Logs). This script is part of an older enterprise resource planning system that has not been fully migrated, causing the rule to flag these routine logs as potential hacktool artifacts.svchost.exe with the service name matching the specific ERP maintenance service, or explicitly exclude the path D:\ERP_Data\Logs\asp4.txt.Scenario: Automated Backup and Archiving Routine