The hypothesis is that the detected behavior may indicate an adversary attempting to exploit a compromised cloud service account to move laterally within an Azure environment. A SOC team should proactively hunt for this behavior to identify potential unauthorized access and lateral movement attempts that could lead to deeper compromise.
YARA Rule
rule cloudfusion_me {
strings: $ = "cloudfusion.me"
condition: any of them
}
This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:
Scenario: Legitimate scheduled backup job using Veeam Backup & Replication
Filter/Exclusion: process.name != "vbm" OR process.name != "vbackup"
Scenario: System administrator running PowerShell scripts for cloud configuration management
Filter/Exclusion: process.name != "powershell.exe" OR process.args NOT LIKE "*cloudfusion*"
Scenario: AWS CloudFormation template deployment via the AWS CLI
Filter/Exclusion: process.name != "aws" OR process.args NOT LIKE "*cloudformation*"
Scenario: Ansible playbook execution for cloud infrastructure provisioning
Filter/Exclusion: process.name != "ansible" OR process.args NOT LIKE "*cloudfusion*"
Scenario: Terraform apply command to provision cloud resources
Filter/Exclusion: process.name != "terraform" OR process.args NOT LIKE "*apply*"