The detection identifies potential Emissary malware activity through the presence of specific malicious files, indicating an adversary may be establishing persistence or exfiltrating data. SOC teams should proactively hunt for this behavior in Azure Sentinel to identify and mitigate advanced threats before they cause significant damage.
YARA Rule
rule Emissary_APT_Malware_1
{
meta:
description = "Detect Emissary Malware - from samples A08E81B411.DAT, ishelp.dll"
author = "Florian Roth"
reference = "http://goo.gl/V0epcf"
date = "2016-01-02"
score = 75
hash1 = "9420017390c598ee535c24f7bcbd39f40eca699d6c94dc35bcf59ddf918c59ab"
hash2 = "70561f58c9e5868f44169854bcc906001947d98d15e9b4d2fbabd1262d938629"
hash3 = "0e64e68f6f88b25530699a1cd12f6f2790ea98e6e8fa3b4bc279f8e5c09d7290"
hash4 = "69caa2a4070559d4cafdf79020c4356c721088eb22398a8740dea8d21ae6e664"
hash5 = "675869fac21a94c8f470765bc6dd15b17cc4492dd639b878f241a45b2c3890fc"
hash6 = "e817610b62ccd00bdfc9129f947ac7d078d97525e9628a3aa61027396dba419b"
hash7 = "a8b0d084949c4f289beb4950f801bf99588d1b05f68587b245a31e8e82f7a1b8"
hash8 = "acf7dc5a10b00f0aac102ecd9d87cd94f08a37b2726cb1e16948875751d04cc9"
hash9 = "e21b47dfa9e250f49a3ab327b7444902e545bed3c4dcfa5e2e990af20593af6d"
hash10 = "e369417a7623d73346f6dff729e68f7e057f7f6dae7bb03d56a7510cb3bfe538"
hash11 = "29d8dc863427c8e37b75eb738069c2172e79607acc7b65de6f8086ba36abf051"
hash12 = "98fb1d2975babc18624e3922406545458642e01360746870deee397df93f50e0"
hash13 = "fbcb401cf06326ab4bb53fb9f01f1ca647f16f926811ea66984f1a1b8cf2f7bb"
strings:
$s1 = "cmd.exe /c %s > %s" fullword ascii
$s2 = "execute cmd timeout." fullword ascii
$s3 = "rundll32.exe \"%s\",Setting" fullword ascii
$s4 = "DownloadFile - exception:%s." fullword ascii
$s5 = "CDllApp::InitInstance() - Evnet create successful." fullword ascii
$s6 = "UploadFile - EncryptBuffer Error" fullword ascii
$s7 = "WinDLL.dll" fullword wide
$s8 = "DownloadFile - exception:%s,code:0x%08x." fullword ascii
$s9 = "Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1)" fullword ascii
$s10 = "CDllApp::InitInstance() - Evnet already exists." fullword ascii
condition:
uint16(0) == 0x5a4d and filesize < 250KB and 3 of them
}
This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:
This rule contains 10 string patterns in its detection logic.
Scenario: Legitimate Windows Update Process
Description: A system may trigger the rule during a Windows Update installation where ishelp.dll is used as part of the update process.
Filter/Exclusion: Check the process tree for svchost.exe or wuauserv.exe and exclude events where the parent process is a known Windows system service.
Scenario: Scheduled System Maintenance Task
Description: A scheduled task running system maintenance (e.g., disk cleanup, defragmentation) may use ishelp.dll or similar components.
Filter/Exclusion: Exclude events where the process is associated with a known system maintenance task (e.g., schtasks.exe or defrag.exe).
Scenario: Microsoft Endpoint Protection (EPP) Scan
Description: During a full system scan by Microsoft Endpoint Protection, the ishelp.dll file may be scanned, triggering the rule.
Filter/Exclusion: Exclude events where the process is mpsvc.exe or mpengine.exe associated with Microsoft Defender.
Scenario: Legitimate Third-Party Software Installation
Description: Some legitimate enterprise software (e.g., Adobe Acrobat, Microsoft Office) may include ishelp.dll or similar files during installation.
Filter/Exclusion: Exclude events where the process is associated with known enterprise software installers (e.g., msiexec.exe, setup.exe).
Scenario: Admin Task Using Process Monitor or Similar Tools
Description: An administrator may use tools like Process Monitor (ProcMon) or similar to debug or monitor system behavior, which could involve ishelp.dll.
Filter/Exclusion: Exclude events where the process is procmon.exe or Procmon64.exe and the user is a domain admin or has elevated privileges