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Detects Empire component - from files Invoke-BypassUAC.ps1, Invoke-CredentialInjection.ps1, Invoke-CredentialInjection.p

yara LOW Yara-Rules
communitycredential-theftevasionlateral-movement
This rule was pulled from an open-source repository and enriched with AI. Validate in a test environment before deploying to production.
View original rule at Yara-Rules →
Retrieved: 2026-06-14T23:00:00Z · Confidence: medium

Hunt Hypothesis

The hypothesis is that the detected files are components of the Empire framework used by adversaries to bypass UAC, inject credentials, perform DCSync, or execute payloads, indicating potential lateral movement or privilege escalation. SOC teams should proactively hunt for these artifacts in Azure Sentinel to identify and mitigate early-stage Empire-based attacks before they lead to deeper network compromise.

YARA Rule

rule Empire_PowerShell_Framework_Gen4 {
   meta:
      description = "Detects Empire component - from files Invoke-BypassUAC.ps1, Invoke-CredentialInjection.ps1, Invoke-CredentialInjection.ps1, Invoke-DCSync.ps1, Invoke-DllInjection.ps1, Invoke-Mimikatz.ps1, Invoke-PsExec.ps1, Invoke-PSInject.ps1, Invoke-ReflectivePEInjection.ps1, Invoke-Shellcode.ps1"
      author = "Florian Roth"
      reference = "https://github.com/adaptivethreat/Empire"
      date = "2016-11-05"
      super_rule = 1
      hash1 = "743c51334f17751cfd881be84b56f648edbdaf31f8186de88d094892edc644a9"
      hash2 = "1be3e3ec0e364db0c00fad2c59c7041e23af4dd59c4cc7dc9dcf46ca507cd6c8"
      hash3 = "1be3e3ec0e364db0c00fad2c59c7041e23af4dd59c4cc7dc9dcf46ca507cd6c8"
      hash4 = "a3428a7d4f9e677623fadff61b2a37d93461123535755ab0f296aa3b0396eb28"
      hash5 = "304031aa9eca5a83bdf1f654285d86df79cb3bba4aa8fe1eb680bd5b2878ebf0"
      hash6 = "4725a57a5f8b717ce316f104e9472e003964f8eae41a67fd8c16b4228e3d00b3"
      hash7 = "0218be4323959fc6379489a6a5e030bb9f1de672326e5e5b8844ab5cedfdcf88"
      hash8 = "61e5ca9c1e8759a78e2c2764169b425b673b500facaca43a26c69ff7e09f62c4"
      hash9 = "eaff29dd0da4ac258d85ecf8b042d73edb01b4db48c68bded2a8b8418dc688b5"
      hash10 = "fa75cfd57269fbe3ad6bdc545ee57eb19335b0048629c93f1dc1fe1059f60438"
   strings:
      $s1 = "Where-Object { $_.GlobalAssemblyCache -And $_.Location.Split('\\\\')[-1].Equals('System.dll') }" fullword ascii
      $s2 = "# Get a handle to the module specified" fullword ascii
      $s3 = "$Kern32Handle = $GetModuleHandle.Invoke($null, @($Module))" fullword ascii
      $s4 = "$DynAssembly = New-Object System.Reflection.AssemblyName('ReflectedDelegate')" fullword ascii
   condition:
      ( uint16(0) == 0x7566 and filesize < 4000KB and 1 of them ) or all of them
}

Deployment Notes

This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:

This rule contains 6 string patterns in its detection logic.

References

False Positive Guidance

Original source: https://github.com/Yara-Rules/rules/blob/main/malware/MALW_Empire.yar