This hypothesis targets the use of Enigma Protector v112 LITE, a commercial obfuscation tool frequently leveraged by adversaries to mask malicious payloads and evade static analysis. Proactively hunting for this signature in Azure Sentinel allows the SOC to identify potentially compromised workstations or servers where attackers have deployed obfuscated binaries to hide their presence and execution logic.
rule Enigma_Protector_v112_LITE: PEiD
{
strings:
$a = { 60 E8 00 00 00 00 5D 83 ED 06 81 ED ?? ?? ?? 00 ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? ?? E8 01 00 00 00 9A 83 C4 04 EB 02 FF 35 60 E8 24 00 00 00 00 00 FF EB 02 CD 20 8B 44 24 0C 83 80 B8 00 00 00 03 31 }
condition:
$a at pe.entry_point
}
This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:
This rule contains 1 string patterns in its detection logic.
msiexec.exe, setup.exe from specific vendor directories) or where the file path resides in standard application installation directories (e.g., C:\Program Files\VendorName\) rather than temporary or user-specific folders.C:\Games\, C:\Steam\) or where the process name matches known modding tools (e.g., ModLoader.exe, AntiCheat.exe) and the user context is a non-administrative service account or a specific “Gaming” or “Dev” AD group.schtasks or Task Scheduler events) to exclude executions triggered by known backup or maintenance jobs (e.g., VeeamBackup.exe, AcronisTrueImage.exe) or where the working directory is a known utility folder (e.g., C:\ProgramData\VendorUtilities\).