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EQGRP Toolset Firewall - from files BananaUsurper-2120, writeJetPlow-2130

yara LOW Yara-Rules
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This rule was pulled from an open-source repository and enriched with AI. Validate in a test environment before deploying to production.
View original rule at Yara-Rules →
Retrieved: 2026-05-23T03:15:01Z · Confidence: medium

Hunt Hypothesis

The hypothesis is that the detection rule identifies potential adversary use of the EQGRP toolset to establish covert network communication through suspicious file execution. SOC teams should proactively hunt for this behavior in Azure Sentinel to identify and mitigate early-stage persistent threats leveraging custom tooling.

YARA Rule

rule EQGRP_BananaUsurper_writeJetPlow
{

    meta:
        description = "EQGRP Toolset Firewall - from files BananaUsurper-2120, writeJetPlow-2130"
        author = "Florian Roth"
        reference = "Research"
        date = "2016-08-16"
        super_rule = 1
        hash1 = "3366b4bbf265716869a487203a8ac39867920880990493dd4dd8385e42b0c119"
        hash2 = "464b4c01f93f31500d2d770360d23bdc37e5ad4885e274a629ea86b2accb7a5c"
 
    strings:
        $x1 = "Implant Version-Specific Values:" fullword ascii
        $x2 = "This function should not be used with a Netscreen, something has gone horribly wrong" fullword ascii
        $s1 = "createSendRecv: recv'd an error from the target." fullword ascii
        $s2 = "Error: WatchDogTimeout read returned %d instead of 4" fullword ascii

    condition:
        ( uint16(0) == 0x457f and filesize < 2000KB and 1 of ($x*) ) or ( 3 of them )
}

Deployment Notes

This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:

This rule contains 4 string patterns in its detection logic.

References

False Positive Guidance

Original source: https://github.com/Yara-Rules/rules/blob/main/malware/APT_EQUATIONGRP.yar