This hypothesis targets the presence of EXECryptor ransomware binaries on endpoints, which may indicate a pre-staging or initial infection phase by the Strongbit development team. Proactively hunting for these specific file signatures allows the SOC to identify dormant or early-stage ransomware deployments before they execute encryption, thereby reducing the potential impact on Azure Sentinel-monitored workloads.
rule EXECryptor_224_StrongbitSoftComplete_Development_h2_additional: PEiD
{
strings:
$a = { E8 F7 FE FF FF 05 ?? ?? 00 00 FF E0 E8 EB FE FF FF 05 ?? ?? 00 00 FF E0 E8 ?? 00 00 00 }
condition:
$a at pe.entry_point
}
This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:
This rule contains 1 string patterns in its detection logic.
strongbit_build.exe) may create temporary executable artifacts in the C:\Users\<dev>\Projects\Strongbit\dist\ directory that match the binary signature.
C:\Users\*\Projects\Strongbit\ or C:\dev\strongbit\builds\ for user accounts in the Dev-Team AD group.C:\Jenkins\workspace\strongbit-pipeline\) that are not immediately cleaned up.
C:\Jenkins\workspace\ or C:\AzureDevOps\agent\_work\ where the parent process is java.exe or msbuild.exe.strongbit_helper.dll or sb_sync.exe) in the C:\Program Files\Strongbit\ or C:\ProgramData\Strongbit\ directories for local data synchronization.
C:\Program Files\Strongbit\ or C:\ProgramData\Strongbit\ if the file has a valid digital signature from “StrongbitSoft” and is not in a user profile directory.StrongbitBackupJob) runs a custom utility sb_encrypt_tool.exe located in C:\Scripts\Maintenance\ to encrypt backup logs nightly. This utility