This detection identifies the execution of a specific cryptographically signed or obfuscated executable associated with the ExeShieldCryptor13RCTomCommander family, which often indicates initial access or fileless malware activity within the environment. Proactively hunting for this signature in Azure Sentinel allows the SOC team to validate legitimate business processes against potential stealthy threats that may evade standard heuristic-based detections due to their low severity classification and specialized YARA pattern matching.
rule ExeShieldCryptor13RCTomCommander
{
meta:
author="malware-lu"
strings:
$a0 = { 55 8B EC 53 56 57 60 E8 00 00 00 00 5D 81 ED 8C 21 40 00 B9 51 2D 40 00 81 E9 E6 21 40 00 8B D5 81 C2 E6 21 40 00 8D 3A 8B F7 33 C0 EB 04 90 EB 01 C2 AC }
condition:
$a0 at pe.entry_point
}
This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:
This rule contains 1 string patterns in its detection logic.
Here are 5 specific false positive scenarios for the ExeShieldCryptor13RCTomCommander detection rule, along with suggested filters and exclusions:
Scenario: Automated Backup Encryption by Veeam or Commvault
Veeam.Backup.Service.exe or commvault.cmd) frequently scan and encrypt large volumes of data on the file system. The YARA rule may misinterpret these legitimate encryption operations as the behavior of the ExeShield cryptor, especially when processing .exe or document files in shared network drives.Process.ImagePath contains "C:\Program Files\Veeam\Backup & Replication" OR Process.ParentImageName == "Veeam.Backup.Service.exe".Scenario: Scheduled Antivirus Definition Updates (Microsoft Defender)
ExeShieldCryptor13RCTomCommander rule.Process.ImagePath contains "C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender" AND Process.CommandLine contains "mpcmdrun.exe".Scenario: Deployment of Application Patches via SCCM/MECM
ccmexec.exe) may