This detection identifies the execution of Watcom C compiler binaries (watcomc.exe) that may indicate an adversary leveraging legitimate build tools to compile custom malware or obfuscate malicious payloads within the environment. A proactive hunt is essential in Azure Sentinel to distinguish these benign compilation activities from potential supply chain compromises where attackers abuse trusted development utilities to establish persistence or evade signature-based detection.
rule FSGv110EngbartxtWatcomCCEXE
{
meta:
author="malware-lu"
strings:
$a0 = { EB 02 CD 20 03 ?? 8D ?? 80 [2] 00 [9] EB 02 }
condition:
$a0 at pe.entry_point
}
This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:
This rule contains 1 string patterns in its detection logic.
Here are 4 specific false positive scenarios for the FSGv110EngbartxtWatcomCCEXE detection rule, along with recommended filters and exclusions:
Scenario 1: Scheduled Antivirus Engine Updates
watcomcc.exe compiler process during nightly scheduled updates to recompile signature definitions. This often occurs between 02:00 and 04:00 UTC on domain-joined servers.02:00–05:00) specifically for the process path C:\Program Files\Symantec Endpoint Protection\Bin\watcomcc.exe. Alternatively, exclude events where the parent process is Symantec Antivirus Client (rtvsc.exe).Scenario 2: Legacy Application Deployment via SCCM
watcomcc.exe to compile runtime components on thousands of workstations simultaneously. This is often triggered by the “Software Center” service (Appdmg.exe).Appdmg.exe or SMS_EXECUTIVE. Additionally, exclude file paths containing \SCCM\ContentLib\ to isolate deployment traffic.Scenario 3: Automated Build Pipelines on CI/CD Agents