The Gafgyt Trojan is detected through suspicious network traffic patterns indicative of command and control communication, which may suggest the presence of a botnet. SOC teams should proactively hunt for this behavior in Azure Sentinel to identify and mitigate potential large-scale distributed attacks before they cause significant damage.
YARA Rule
rule Gafgyt_Botnet_bash : MALW
{
meta:
description = "Gafgyt Trojan"
author = "Joan Soriano / @joanbtl"
date = "2017-05-25"
version = "1.0"
MD5 = "c8d58acfe524a09d4df7ffbe4a43c429"
SHA1 = "b41fefa8470f3b3657594af18d2ea4f6ac4d567f"
strings:
$s1 = "PONG!"
$s2 = "GETLOCALIP"
$s3 = "HTTPFLOOD"
$s4 = "LUCKYLILDUDE"
condition:
$s1 and $s2 and $s3 and $s4
}
This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:
This rule contains 4 string patterns in its detection logic.
Scenario: Legitimate scheduled job running a known Gafgyt variant for testing purposes
Filter/Exclusion: process.name != "gafgyt-test-tool" or process.parent.name == "task scheduler"
Scenario: System update or patching tool that includes a Gafgyt binary as part of a multi-component update package
Filter/Exclusion: process.name != "update_manager.exe" or process.parent.name == "windows update"
Scenario: Admin using a network scanning tool that includes Gafgyt for penetration testing
Filter/Exclusion: process.name != "nmap.exe" or process.parent.name == "penetration_testing_tool"
Scenario: False positive from a third-party security tool that bundles Gafgyt as part of its own payload
Filter/Exclusion: process.name != "third_party_antivirus.exe" or process.parent.name == "security_tool"
Scenario: Legitimate system process that shares the same hash as a known Gafgyt variant due to signature overlap
Filter/Exclusion: file.hash != "known_gafgyt_hash" or file.type == "system_binary"