Attackers may use remote WMI execution to gain code execution on an ADFS server, leveraging T1210 to maintain persistence and exfiltrate data. SOC teams should proactively hunt for this behavior in Azure Sentinel to identify and mitigate potential compromises of critical identity infrastructure.
KQL Query
let timeframe = 1d;
// Adjust for a longer timeframe for identifying ADFS Servers
let lookback = 6d;
// Identify ADFS Servers
let ADFS_Servers = ( union isfuzzy=true
( Event
| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe+lookback)
| where Source == "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon"
| where EventID == 1
| extend EventData = parse_xml(EventData).DataItem.EventData.Data
| mv-expand bagexpansion=array EventData
| evaluate bag_unpack(EventData)
| extend Key=tostring(['@Name']), Value=['#text']
| evaluate pivot(Key, any(Value), TimeGenerated, Source, EventLog, Computer, EventLevel, EventLevelName, UserName, RenderedDescription, MG, ManagementGroupName, Type, _ResourceId)
| extend process = split(Image, '\\', -1)[-1]
| where process =~ "Microsoft.IdentityServer.ServiceHost.exe"
| distinct Computer
),
( SecurityEvent
| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe+lookback)
| where EventID == 4688 and SubjectLogonId != "0x3e4"
| where ProcessName has "Microsoft.IdentityServer.ServiceHost.exe"
| distinct Computer
),
(WindowsEvent
| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe+lookback)
| where EventID == 4688 and EventData has "0x3e4" and EventData has "Microsoft.IdentityServer.ServiceHost.exe"
| extend SubjectLogonId = tostring(EventData.SubjectLogonId)
| where SubjectLogonId != "0x3e4"
| extend ProcessName = tostring(EventData.ProcessName)
| where ProcessName has "Microsoft.IdentityServer.ServiceHost.exe"
| distinct Computer
)
| distinct Computer);
(union isfuzzy=true
(
SecurityEvent
| where EventID == 4688
| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe)
| where Computer in~ (ADFS_Servers)
| where ParentProcessName has 'wmiprvse.exe'
// Looking for rundll32.exe is based on intel from the blog linked in the description
// This can be commented out or altered to filter out known internal uses
| where CommandLine has_any ('rundll32')
| project TimeGenerated, TargetAccount, CommandLine, Computer, Account, TargetLogonId
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated
| extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))
| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)
| extend AccountName = tostring(split(Account, "\\")[0]), AccountNTDomain = tostring(split(Account, "\\")[1])
// Search for recent logons to identify lateral movement
| join kind= inner
(SecurityEvent
| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe)
| where EventID == 4624 and LogonType == 3
| where Account !endswith "$"
| project TargetLogonId
) on TargetLogonId
),
(
WindowsEvent
| where EventID == 4688
| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe)
| where Computer in~ (ADFS_Servers)
| where EventData has 'wmiprvse.exe' and EventData has_any ('rundll32')
| extend ParentProcessName = tostring(EventData.ParentProcessName)
| where ParentProcessName has 'wmiprvse.exe'
// Looking for rundll32.exe is based on intel from the blog linked in the description
// This can be commented out or altered to filter out known internal uses
| extend CommandLine = tostring(EventData.CommandLine)
| where CommandLine has_any ('rundll32')
| extend TargetAccount = strcat(EventData.TargetDomainName,"\\", EventData.TargetUserName)
| extend Account = strcat(EventData.TargetDomainName,"\\", EventData.TargetUserName)
| extend TargetLogonId = tostring(EventData.TargetLogonId)
| project TimeGenerated, TargetAccount, CommandLine, Computer, Account, TargetLogonId
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated
| extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))
| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)
| extend AccountName = tostring(split(Account, "\\")[0]), AccountNTDomain = tostring(split(Account, "\\")[1])
// Search for recent logons to identify lateral movement
| join kind= inner
(WindowsEvent
| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe)
| where EventID == 4624
| extend LogonType = tostring(EventData.LogonType)
| where LogonType == 3
| extend Account = strcat(EventData.TargetDomainName,"\\", EventData.TargetUserName)
| where Account !endswith "$"
| extend TargetLogonId = tostring(EventData.TargetLogonId)
| project TargetLogonId
) on TargetLogonId
),
(
Event
| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe)
| where Source == "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon"
// Check for WMI Events
| where Computer in~ (ADFS_Servers) and EventID in (19, 20, 21)
| extend EventData = parse_xml(EventData).DataItem.EventData.Data
| mv-expand bagexpansion=array EventData
| evaluate bag_unpack(EventData)
| extend Key=tostring(['@Name']), Value=['#text']
| evaluate pivot(Key, any(Value), TimeGenerated, Source, EventLog, Computer, EventLevel, EventLevelName, UserName, RenderedDescription, MG, ManagementGroupName, Type, _ResourceId)
| project TimeGenerated, EventType, Image, Computer, UserName
| extend timestamp = TimeGenerated
| extend HostName = tostring(split(Computer, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(Computer, '.'))
| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(Computer, DomainIndex + 1), Computer)
| extend AccountName = tostring(split(UserName, "\\")[0]), AccountNTDomain = tostring(split(UserName, "\\")[1])
)
)
id: 0bd65651-1404-438b-8f63-eecddcec87b4
name: Gain Code Execution on ADFS Server via Remote WMI Execution
description: |
'This query detects instances where an attacker has gained the ability to execute code on an ADFS Server through remote WMI Execution.
In order to use this query you need to be collecting Sysmon EventIDs 19, 20, and 21.
If you do not have Sysmon data in your workspace this query will raise an error stating:
Failed to resolve scalar expression named "[@Name]"
For more on how WMI was used in Solorigate see https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2021/01/20/deep-dive-into-the-solorigate-second-stage-activation-from-sunburst-to-teardrop-and-raindrop/.
The query contains some features from the following detections to look for potentially malicious ADFS activity. See them for more details.
- ADFS DKM Master Key Export: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/master/Detections/MultipleDataSources/ADFS-DKM-MasterKey-Export.yaml'
severity: Medium
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: SecurityEvents
dataTypes:
- SecurityEvent
- connectorId: WindowsSecurityEvents
dataTypes:
- SecurityEvents
- connectorId: WindowsForwardedEvents
dataTypes:
- WindowsEvent
queryFrequency: 1d
queryPeriod: 7d
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
- LateralMovement
relevantTechniques:
- T1210
tags:
- Solorigate
- NOBELIUM
query: |
let timeframe = 1d;
// Adjust for a longer timeframe for identifying ADFS Servers
let lookback = 6d;
// Identify ADFS Servers
let ADFS_Servers = ( union isfuzzy=true
( Event
| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe+lookback)
| where Source == "Microsoft-Windows-Sysmon"
| where EventID == 1
| extend EventData = parse_xml(EventData).DataItem.EventData.Data
| mv-expand bagexpansion=array EventData
| evaluate bag_unpack(EventData)
| extend Key=tostring(['@Name']), Value=['#text']
| evaluate pivot(Key, any(Value), TimeGenerated, Source, EventLog, Computer, EventLevel, EventLevelName, UserName, RenderedDescription, MG, ManagementGroupName, Type, _ResourceId)
| extend process = split(Image, '\\', -1)[-1]
| where process =~ "Microsoft.IdentityServer.ServiceHost.exe"
| distinct Computer
),
( SecurityEvent
| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe+lookback)
| where EventID == 4688 and SubjectLogonId != "0x3e4"
| where ProcessName has "Microsoft.IdentityServer.ServiceHost.exe"
| distinct Computer
),
(WindowsEvent
| where TimeGenerated > ago(timeframe+lookback)
| where EventID == 4688 and EventData has "0x3e4" and EventData has "Microsoft.IdentityServer.ServiceHost.exe"
| extend SubjectLogonId = tostring(EventData.SubjectLogonId)
| where SubjectLogonId != "0x3e4"
| extend ProcessName = tostring(EventData.ProcessName)
| where ProcessName has "Microsoft.IdentityServer.ServiceHost.exe"
| distinct Computer
)
| distinct Computer);
(union isfuzzy=true
(
SecurityEvent
| where EventID == 4688
| Sentinel Table | Notes |
|---|---|
SecurityEvent | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
WindowsEvent | Ensure this data connector is enabled |
Scenario: Scheduled Job for System Maintenance
Description: A legitimate scheduled job runs a script on the ADFS server that uses WMI for system monitoring or maintenance tasks.
Filter/Exclusion: Exclude events where the process is schtasks.exe and the command line includes known maintenance scripts (e.g., C:\Windows\System32\wbem\WMIC.exe with process or startup commands).
Scenario: Remote WMI Management by IT Admins
Description: An IT administrator uses WMI to remotely manage ADFS servers, such as checking service status or applying patches.
Filter/Exclusion: Exclude events where the source IP is from the internal IT management network and the user is a known admin account (e.g., DOMAIN\ITAdmin).
Scenario: PowerShell Script Using WMI for Data Collection
Description: A legitimate PowerShell script uses WMI to collect system information from the ADFS server as part of a regular audit or reporting process.
Filter/Exclusion: Exclude events where the process is powershell.exe and the command line includes Get-WmiObject or Invoke-WmiMethod with known audit scripts.
Scenario: Software Inventory Scan via WMI
Description: A software inventory tool uses WMI to scan the ADFS server for installed applications as part of a compliance check.
Filter/Exclusion: Exclude events where the process is SoftwareInventoryTool.exe or similar and the command line includes wmic with product or software queries.
Scenario: Remote WMI Execution for Patch Deployment
Description: A patch management system uses WMI to deploy updates to the ADFS server, which may involve code execution as part of the update process.
Filter/Exclusion: Exclude events where the process is