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HackTool - Impacket File Indicators

sigma HIGH SigmaHQ
T1003.001
imFileEvent
This rule was pulled from an open-source repository and enriched with AI. Validate in a test environment before deploying to production.
View original rule at SigmaHQ →
Retrieved: 2026-03-25T03:05:59Z · Confidence: low

Hunt Hypothesis

Adversaries may use Impacket tools to exfiltrate data or establish command and control by creating suspicious files with specific naming patterns. SOC teams should proactively hunt for these indicators in Azure Sentinel to identify potential lateral movement or data exfiltration activities early.

Detection Rule

Sigma (Original)

title: HackTool - Impacket File Indicators
id: 03f4ca17-de95-428d-a75a-4ee78b047256
related:
    - id: 6e2a900a-ced9-4e4a-a9c2-13e706f9518a
      type: similar
status: experimental
description: Detects file creation events with filename patterns used by Impacket.
references:
    - https://thedfirreport.com/2025/05/19/another-confluence-bites-the-dust-falling-to-elpaco-team-ransomware/
    - https://github.com/fortra/impacket
author: "The DFIR Report, IrishDeath"
date: 2025-05-19
tags:
    - attack.credential-access
    - attack.t1003.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection_names_re:
        TargetFilename|re: '\\sessionresume_[a-zA-Z]{8}$' # https://github.com/fortra/impacket/blob/ead516a1209742efc7ac550707a9304ba08681e9/impacket/examples/secretsdump.py#L1925C38-L1925C51
    condition: selection_names_re
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

KQL (Azure Sentinel)

imFileEvent
| where TargetFileName matches regex "\\\\sessionresume_[a-zA-Z]{8}$"

False Positive Guidance

MITRE ATT&CK Context

Original source: https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_impacket_file_indicators.yml