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Command shell wrapper for WMI

yara LOW signature-base
florian-rothwmi
This rule was pulled from an open-source repository and enriched with AI. Validate in a test environment before deploying to production.
View original rule at signature-base →
Retrieved: 2026-05-28T23:00:01Z · Confidence: medium

Hunt Hypothesis

Adversaries may use a command shell wrapper for WMI to execute arbitrary commands while evading traditional command-line detection. SOC teams should proactively hunt for this behavior in Azure Sentinel to identify potential persistence or execution tactics that could lead to deeper compromise.

YARA Rule

rule hacktool_windows_ncc_wmicmd : FILE {
    meta:
        description = "Command shell wrapper for WMI"
        reference = "https://github.com/nccgroup/WMIcmd"
        author = "@mimeframe"
        id = "16f616e2-120c-5067-b083-957f49cb0baa"
    strings:
        $a1 = "Need to specify a username, domain and password for non local connections" wide ascii
        $a2 = "WS-Management is running on the remote host" wide ascii
        $a3 = "firewall (if enabled) allows connections" wide ascii
        $a4 = "WARNING: Didn't see stdout output finished marker - output may be truncated" wide ascii
        $a5 = "Command sleep in milliseconds - increase if getting truncated output" wide ascii
        $b1 = "0x800706BA" wide ascii
        $b2 = "NTLMDOMAIN:" wide ascii
        $b3 = "cimv2" wide ascii
    condition:
        any of ($a*) or all of ($b*)
}

Deployment Notes

This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:

This rule contains 8 string patterns in its detection logic.

References

False Positive Guidance

Original source: https://github.com/Neo23x0/signature-base/blob/main/vendor/yara/airbnb_binaryalert.yar