This rule detects adversaries deploying compressed archive files like “Burst.rar” to conceal and deliver malicious hacking tools that may evade initial signature-based scanning. Proactive hunting for this behavior in Azure Sentinel is critical because attackers frequently use such archives to stage post-exploitation tools, allowing them to establish a foothold before executing their primary payload.
rule Hacktools_CN_Panda_Burst {
meta:
description = "Disclosed hacktool set - file Burst.rar"
author = "Florian Roth"
date = "17.11.14"
score = 60
hash = "ce8e3d95f89fb887d284015ff2953dbdb1f16776"
strings:
$s0 = "@sql.exe -f ip.txt -m syn -t 3306 -c 5000 -u http://60.15.124.106:63389/tasksvr." ascii
condition:
all of them
}
This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:
This rule contains 1 string patterns in its detection logic.
Here are 4 specific false positive scenarios for the “Disclosed hacktool set - file Burst.rar” detection rule, including targeted filters and exclusions:
Scenario: Automated Patch Deployment via RAR Archives
.rar format. These archives are extracted by the deployment engine (such as Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager (MECM) or PDQ Deploy) on endpoint machines, triggering the rule when the extraction process creates temporary files named Burst.rar.ccmexec.exe (MECM) or pdqagent.exe and the file path resides within a dedicated patch distribution folder (e.g., C:\ProgramData\PatchBurst\).Scenario: Software Asset Management Inventory Scans
Burst.rar during the scanning window, which is then unpacked by the agent service.svc-discovery or svc-inventory) and the file path matches the agent’s working directory pattern (e.g., C:\Program Files\Lansweeper\Agent\Temp\Burst.rar).**Scenario: Scheduled Backup of Configuration Snap