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Detects Nightmare-Eclipse/BlueHammer (FunnyApp), a Windows local privilege escalation PoC that abuses a Defender signatu

yara CRITICAL signature-base
bluehammer_apr26credential-theftflorian-roth
This rule was pulled from an open-source repository and enriched with AI. Validate in a test environment before deploying to production.
View original rule at signature-base →
Retrieved: 2026-08-05T23:00:00Z · Confidence: medium

Hunt Hypothesis

This detection identifies adversaries exploiting a race condition in Windows Defender’s signature update mechanism to escalate local privileges and exfiltrate the SAM hive for credential harvesting. Proactive hunting is essential because this specific attack vector mimics legitimate system processes, allowing attackers to silently compromise domain credentials before triggering broader alerting mechanisms.

YARA Rule

rule HKTL_BlueHammer_Apr26 {
   meta:
      author = "AzizFarghly (Nextron-Systems)"
      description = "Detects Nightmare-Eclipse/BlueHammer (FunnyApp), a Windows local privilege escalation PoC that abuses a Defender signature-update RPC and a junction/symlink race to leak the SAM hive and derive NTLM hashes - giving an unprivileged user full SYSTEM-level credential access."
      date = "2026-04-07"
      reference = "https://github.com/Nightmare-Eclipse/BlueHammer"
      hash = "6514f56223999eb86a19ea9f2abbfb0f407934a1a0694ffb94a8ea37113073f4"
      hash = "93008c42764b74b759678fd376abd90696f74af408600727b6649286d8424270"
      hash = "b25e903988e530df00658ff3ad6d180e43d6660b705ad6d0def4a29ee1167e52"
      hash = "82eb727e2a2b3334a70fa2d357ba4f44dc989a650a6a18222dd5d1bb1444b496"
      hash = "b33f3f31c83fc655952fab73d72b673b92ed4f205daee56444903201316cfc4a"
      hash = "c6baa5ec9ea2c2802a90acad5a53453d176a02e04a31ac8e9b7b34b5e3329b84"
      hash = "552dba31a446e96416738d84d4366503c397ba508a732719531c89a41abf3704"
      hash = "c9bec499db6a0a2165bcd2a211c8887e5fadf954eb9a2e5d3c6ca833e4a5ef64"
      score = 90
      id = "595bf733-b287-5048-88e2-b88caffc7a5d"
   strings:
      $x1 = "Junction created %ws => %ws"
      $x2 = "connect to windows defender RPC port !!!"

      $s1 = "\\System32\\Config\\SAM" wide
      $s2 = "IMpService77BDAF73-B396-481F-9042-AD358843EC24" wide
      $s3 = "ServerMpUpdateEngineSignature"

      $op1 = { 8D 47 02 66 89 43 0C 66 C7 43 0E 02 00 48 8B C7 48 D1 E8 66 44 89 7C 43 12 }
   condition:
      uint16(0) == 0x5A4D
      and filesize < 7MB
      and (
         1 of ($x*)
         or all of ($s*)
         or $op1
      )
      or 3 of them
}

Deployment Notes

This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:

This rule contains 6 string patterns in its detection logic.

References

False Positive Guidance

Here are 3-5 specific false positive scenarios for the Nightmare-Eclipse/BlueHammer detection rule, including suggested filters or exclusions:

Original source: https://github.com/Neo23x0/signature-base/blob/main/yara/htkl_blue_hammer_tool.yar