This rule identifies potential adversary activity by detecting the execution of known .NET-based red and blue team tools through their unique TypeLibGUID signatures within Azure Sentinel. Proactively hunting for these indicators allows the SOC to distinguish legitimate security tooling from malicious .NET processes that may mimic similar behaviors, thereby reducing false positives and uncovering stealthy reconnaissance or post-exploitation activities.
rule HKTL_NET_GUID_DInvoke {
meta:
description = "Detects .NET red/black-team tools via typelibguid"
reference = "https://github.com/TheWover/DInvoke"
author = "Arnim Rupp"
date = "2021-01-21"
strings:
$typelibguid0 = "b77fdab5-207c-4cdb-b1aa-348505c54229" ascii nocase wide
condition:
(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint32(uint32(0x3C)) == 0x00004550) and any of them
}
This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:
This rule contains 1 string patterns in its detection logic.
Here are 5 specific false positive scenarios for the rule “Detects .NET red/black-team tools via typelibguid,” including suggested filters and exclusions:
Scenario: Automated Backup Agent Execution
Veeam.Backup.Service.exe or rubrik-agent.exe running under the SYSTEM or dedicated service accounts (e.g., DOMAIN\VeeamService) when the execution path is within the standard installation directory (C:\Program Files\...).Scenario: Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager (SCCM) Updates
ccmexec.exe and WUAEngine.exe processes where the parent process is smss.exe (Session Manager) or svchost.exe, specifically filtering out GUIDs known to be part of the Microsoft Update stack.Scenario: Internal DevOps CI/CD Pipeline Agents