This hunt hypothesis identifies adversary activity where attackers leverage specific .NET-based red and black team tools by analyzing unique TypeLibGUID signatures within process execution events. Proactively hunting for these indicators in Azure Sentinel allows the SOC to distinguish legitimate security tooling from potential malicious reconnaissance or lateral movement attempts that mimic standard administrative workflows.
rule HKTL_NET_GUID_RegistryStrikesBack {
meta:
description = "Detects .NET red/black-team tools via typelibguid"
reference = "https://github.com/mdsecactivebreach/RegistryStrikesBack"
author = "Arnim Rupp"
date = "2021-01-21"
strings:
$typelibguid0 = "90ebd469-d780-4431-9bd8-014b00057665" ascii nocase wide
condition:
(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint32(uint32(0x3C)) == 0x00004550) and any of them
}
This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:
This rule contains 1 string patterns in its detection logic.
Here are 4 specific false positive scenarios for the rule “Detects .NET red/black-team tools via typelibguid,” along with suggested filters or exclusions:
Scenario: Automated Backup and Recovery Jobs
typelibguid values during scheduled snapshot creation, inventory scanning, or restore verification tasks.Veeam.Backup.Service.exe, rubrik-agent.exe) and restrict detection to non-standard user accounts (excluding SYSTEM and specific service accounts like vbr_service).Scenario: Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager (SCCM/MECM) Deployments
ccmexec.exe) often launches .NET-based custom installation scripts or inventory tools. These tools generate unique typelibguid signatures that mimic red-team reconnaissance utilities when they enumerate installed applications or registry keys on endpoints.ccmexec.exe and the execution path resides within the standard SCCM installation directory (e.g., C:\Program Files\Microsoft Configuration Manager).Scenario: Identity Management and Provisioning Tools
typelibguid values that overlap with common threat hunting tools like BloodHound or SharpUp.