This detection identifies potential adversary activity by monitoring for specific TypeLibGUID values associated with known C# red and blue team reconnaissance or attack tools within the Azure Sentinel environment. Proactive hunting for these indicators is essential to distinguish legitimate security operations from malicious tool usage that may otherwise blend into normal background noise, ensuring early visibility into stealthy post-exploitation movements.
rule HKTL_NET_GUID_SharpMove {
meta:
description = "Detects c# red/black-team tools via typelibguid"
reference = "https://github.com/0xthirteen/SharpMove"
author = "Arnim Rupp"
date = "2020-12-28"
strings:
$typelibguid0 = "8bf82bbe-909c-4777-a2fc-ea7c070ff43e" ascii nocase wide
condition:
(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint32(uint32(0x3C)) == 0x00004550) and any of them
}
This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:
This rule contains 1 string patterns in its detection logic.
Here are 5 specific false positive scenarios for the “Detects C# Red/Black-Team Tools via TypelibGUID” rule, including suggested filters and exclusions:
Scenario: Automated CI/CD Pipeline Execution
Microsoft.VisualStudio.Shell.Interop or similar C# typelibs during compilation and testing phases. These legitimate builds mimic the behavior of Red Team automation tools by loading standard Visual Studio interop libraries.NT SERVICE\Jenkins, AZURE-DEVOPS-BUILD) or restrict alerts to exclude known build server hostnames/IP ranges where compilation is expected 24/7.Scenario: Endpoint Management & Patching Tools
ccmexec.exe, IvantiAgent.exe, or TaskHost.exe when they are executing scheduled maintenance tasks during defined business hours (e.g., 08:00–18:00).Scenario: Internal Developer IDE Usage