This rule identifies the execution of specialized C# Red and Black team security tools by analyzing unique TypeLibGUID signatures within Azure Sentinel logs. Proactively hunting for these indicators allows the SOC to distinguish between legitimate security operations and potential adversary activity that mimics standard tooling behavior, ensuring early visibility into reconnaissance or post-exploitation phases.
rule HKTL_NET_GUID_StandIn {
meta:
description = "Detects c# red/black-team tools via typelibguid"
reference = "https://github.com/FuzzySecurity/StandIn"
author = "Arnim Rupp"
date = "2020-12-21"
strings:
$typelibguid0 = "01c142ba-7af1-48d6-b185-81147a2f7db7" ascii nocase wide
condition:
(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint32(uint32(0x3C)) == 0x00004550) and any of them
}
This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:
This rule contains 1 string patterns in its detection logic.
Here are 5 specific false positive scenarios for the “Detects C# Red/Black-Team Tools via TypelibGUID” rule, including suggested filters and exclusions:
Scenario: Automated Deployment of Microsoft Visual Studio Extensions
VSTT (Visual Studio Team Services) service account or filter by process path containing \Program Files\Microsoft Visual Studio\.Scenario: Scheduled Execution of Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager (SCCM)
ccmexec.exe or WUAHandler.exe when executed from the \Windows\CCM\ directory, specifically during the defined maintenance window (e.g., 02:00 – 04:00).Scenario: Development Environment Build Artifacts on Engineering Workstations
msbuild.exe or dotnet.exe.