Detects .NET red/black-team tools via name

Hunt Hypothesis

This detection rule identifies the execution of known .NET-based red and black team tools by analyzing process names to distinguish legitimate security activities from potential adversary reconnaissance or tool deployment. Proactive hunting for these artifacts in Azure Sentinel is essential to establish a baseline of authorized security operations, enabling analysts to quickly differentiate between expected defensive actions and suspicious lateral movement or persistence attempts by threat actors mimicking similar tooling.

YARA Rule

rule HKTL_NET_NAME_Ghostpack_CompiledBinaries {
    meta:
        description = "Detects .NET red/black-team tools via name"
        reference = "https://github.com/r3motecontrol/Ghostpack-CompiledBinaries"
        author = "Arnim Rupp"
        date = "2021-01-22"
    strings:
        $name = "Ghostpack-CompiledBinaries" ascii wide
        $compile = "AssemblyTitle" ascii wide
    condition:
        (uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint32(uint32(0x3C)) == 0x00004550) and all of them
}

Deployment Notes

This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:

• Microsoft Defender for Endpoint — Custom indicators / advanced hunting
• Email Gateway — Attachment scanning
• File Share Monitoring — Periodic scanning of shared drives
• YARA CLI — Manual threat hunting on endpoints

This rule contains 2 string patterns in its detection logic.

References

• https://github.com/r3motecontrol/Ghostpack-CompiledBinaries
• Source Rule

False Positive Guidance

Here are 5 specific false positive scenarios for the rule “Detects .NET red/blue-team tools via name,” including suggested filters or exclusions:

• Scenario: Automated Patch Deployment via SCCM/Intune

  • Context: Enterprise Configuration Management (SCCM) or Microsoft Intune agents frequently execute .NET based deployment scripts that utilize tool names similar to PowerShell, Invoke-Command, or custom wrappers like AppDeployTool.exe. These often run during business hours on endpoint machines.
  • Filter/Exclusion: Exclude processes where the parent process is ccmsetup.exe (SCCM) or Microsoft.IntuneManagementAgent.exe, and restrict detection to non-standard user accounts (exclude SYSTEM and Local Service).

• Scenario: Scheduled Backup Jobs using Veeam or Commvault

  • Context: Enterprise backup solutions often rely on .NET-based agents that spawn processes with names resembling security tools, such as Veeam.Backup.Agent.exe or Commvault.ClientAgent.dll. These jobs run nightly and may trigger the rule when they instantiate specific monitoring modules.
  • Filter/Exclusion: Create an exclusion for process paths located in standard backup vendor directories (e.g., C:\Program Files\Veeam\..., C:\Program Files\Commvault\...) and exclude known service accounts like VeeamBackupService or CommvaultAgent.

• Scenario: Internal DevOps CI/CD Pipeline Execution

  • Context: Build servers (e.g., Azure DevAgents, Jenkins) running on shared infrastructure often execute .NET-based analysis tools (like SonarQube scanners or custom unit test runners) named TestRunner.exe or CodeAnalysisTool.dll. These run frequently during development cycles.
  • Filter/Exclusion: Filter out detections where the