This rule identifies the execution of known .NET-based Red and Black team utility names to distinguish legitimate security operations from potential adversary tooling that mimics these signatures. Proactive hunting for this behavior in Azure Sentinel is essential to reduce false positives during incident response and to uncover stealthy attackers leveraging familiar .NET frameworks to blend into normal administrative activity.
rule HKTL_NET_NAME_tvasion {
meta:
description = "Detects .NET red/black-team tools via name"
reference = "https://github.com/loadenmb/tvasion"
author = "Arnim Rupp"
date = "2021-01-22"
strings:
$name = "tvasion" ascii wide
$compile = "AssemblyTitle" ascii wide
condition:
(uint16(0) == 0x5A4D and uint32(uint32(0x3C)) == 0x00004550) and all of them
}
This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:
This rule contains 2 string patterns in its detection logic.
Here are 5 specific false positive scenarios for the rule “Detects .NET red/blue-team tools via name,” including suggested filters and exclusions:
Scenario: Automated CI/CD Pipeline Execution
.exe files named dotnet.exe, msbuild.exe, or specific test runners like vstest.console.exe during nightly builds. These tools often reside in build agent directories rather than standard application folders.VSTS.Agent.exe, jenkins-agent.exe) or restrict detection to specific build server hostnames and paths (e.g., C:\BuildAgents\*).Scenario: Scheduled Backup or Reporting Jobs
ReportServerService.exe or InventoryAgent.exe which may match the rule’s keyword list for “black-team” monitoring tools.svchost.exe running a specific Task Scheduler ID) or filter by file path containing keywords like \Reports\, \Backup\, or \Scripts\.Scenario: Endpoint Protection Scanning
C-Defense.exe, SentinelAgent.exe, or generic names like SecurityMonitor.exe that mimic the naming convention of red/blue team tools.