Identify Mango Sandstorm powershell commands

Hunt Hypothesis

The hypothesis is that the detected PowerShell commands are indicative of Mango Sandstorm’s tactics to execute malicious payloads and establish persistence within a network. SOC teams should proactively hunt for this behavior in Azure Sentinel to identify and mitigate potential compromise from this advanced threat actor.

KQL Query

(union isfuzzy=true
(SecurityEvent
| where EventID == 4688
| where Process has_any ("powershell.exe","powershell_ise.exe","pwsh.exe") and CommandLine has_cs "-exec bypass -w 1 -enc"
| where CommandLine  contains_cs "UwB0AGEAcgB0AC0ASgBvAGIAIAAtAFMAYwByAGkAcAB0AEIAbABvAGMAawAgAHsAKABzAGEAcABzACAAKAAiAHAA"
| extend DvcHostname = Computer, ProcessId = tostring(ProcessId), ActorUsername = Account
),
(DeviceProcessEvents
| where FileName =~ "powershell.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has_cs "-exec bypass -w 1 -enc"
| where ProcessCommandLine contains_cs "UwB0AGEAcgB0AC0ASgBvAGIAIAAtAFMAYwByAGkAcAB0AEIAbABvAGMAawAgAHsAKABzAGEAcABzACAAKAAiAHAA"
| extend DvcHostname = DeviceName, ProcessId = tostring(InitiatingProcessId), ActorUsername = strcat(AccountDomain, @"\", AccountName)
),
(imProcessCreate
| where Process has_any ("powershell.exe","powershell_ise.exe","pwsh.exe") and CommandLine has_cs "-exec bypass -w 1 -enc"
| where CommandLine  contains_cs "UwB0AGEAcgB0AC0ASgBvAGIAIAAtAFMAYwByAGkAcAB0AEIAbABvAGMAawAgAHsAKABzAGEAcABzACAAKAAiAHAA"
| extend ProcessId = tostring(TargetProcessId)
)
)
| extend AccountName = tostring(split(ActorUsername, "\\")[0]), AccountNTDomain = tostring(split(ActorUsername, "\\")[1])
| extend HostName = tostring(split(DvcHostname, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(DvcHostname, '.'))
| extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(DvcHostname, DomainIndex + 1), DvcHostname)

Analytic Rule Definition

id: ce74dc9a-cb3c-4081-8c2f-7d39f6b7bae1
name: Identify Mango Sandstorm powershell commands
description: |
  'The query below identifies powershell commands used by the threat actor Mango Sandstorm.
  Reference:  https://www.microsoft.com/security/blog/2022/08/25/mercury-leveraging-log4j-2-vulnerabilities-in-unpatched-systems-to-target-israeli-organizations/'
severity: High
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: SecurityEvents
    dataTypes:
      - SecurityEvent
  - connectorId: MicrosoftThreatProtection
    dataTypes:
      - DeviceProcessEvents
queryFrequency: 1d
queryPeriod: 1d
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - LateralMovement
relevantTechniques:
  - T1570
tags:
  - Mango Sandstorm
  - Schema: ASIMFileEvent
    SchemaVersion: 0.1.0
query: |
  (union isfuzzy=true
  (SecurityEvent
  | where EventID == 4688
  | where Process has_any ("powershell.exe","powershell_ise.exe","pwsh.exe") and CommandLine has_cs "-exec bypass -w 1 -enc"
  | where CommandLine  contains_cs "UwB0AGEAcgB0AC0ASgBvAGIAIAAtAFMAYwByAGkAcAB0AEIAbABvAGMAawAgAHsAKABzAGEAcABzACAAKAAiAHAA"
  | extend DvcHostname = Computer, ProcessId = tostring(ProcessId), ActorUsername = Account
  ),
  (DeviceProcessEvents
  | where FileName =~ "powershell.exe" and ProcessCommandLine has_cs "-exec bypass -w 1 -enc"
  | where ProcessCommandLine contains_cs "UwB0AGEAcgB0AC0ASgBvAGIAIAAtAFMAYwByAGkAcAB0AEIAbABvAGMAawAgAHsAKABzAGEAcABzACAAKAAiAHAA"
  | extend DvcHostname = DeviceName, ProcessId = tostring(InitiatingProcessId), ActorUsername = strcat(AccountDomain, @"\", AccountName)
  ),
  (imProcessCreate
  | where Process has_any ("powershell.exe","powershell_ise.exe","pwsh.exe") and CommandLine has_cs "-exec bypass -w 1 -enc"
  | where CommandLine  contains_cs "UwB0AGEAcgB0AC0ASgBvAGIAIAAtAFMAYwByAGkAcAB0AEIAbABvAGMAawAgAHsAKABzAGEAcABzACAAKAAiAHAA"
  | extend ProcessId = tostring(TargetProcessId)
  )
  )
  | extend AccountName = tostring(split(ActorUsername, "\\")[0]), AccountNTDomain = tostring(split(ActorUsername, "\\")[1])
  | extend HostName = tostring(split(DvcHostname, ".")[0]), DomainIndex = toint(indexof(DvcHostname, '.'))
  | extend HostNameDomain = iff(DomainIndex != -1, substring(DvcHostname, DomainIndex + 1), DvcHostname)
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: FullName
        columnName: ActorUsername
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: AccountName
      - identifier: NTDomain
        columnName: AccountNTDomain
  - entityType: Host
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: FullName
        columnName: DvcHostname
      - identifier: HostName
        columnName: HostName
      - identifier: NTDomain
        columnName: HostNameDomain
  - entityType: Process
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: ProcessId
        columnName: ProcessId
version: 1.0.5
kind: Scheduled
metadata:
    source:
        kind: Community
    author:
        name: Microsoft Security Research
    support:
        tier: Community
    categories:
   

Required Data Sources

MITRE ATT&CK Context

• Tactic: LateralMovement
• Technique: T1570 — T1570

References

• Source Query

False Positive Guidance

• Scenario: Legitimate PowerShell Script for System Monitoring
  Description: A system administrator runs a PowerShell script using Get-EventLog or Get-WinEvent to monitor system logs as part of routine maintenance.
  Filter/Exclusion: ProcessName not in ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe") or CommandLine not like "*Get-EventLog*" and CommandLine not like "*Get-WinEvent*"

• Scenario: Scheduled Job for Log Rotation
  Description: A scheduled task runs a PowerShell script to rotate and archive log files using Move-Item or Remove-Item commands.
  Filter/Exclusion: CommandLine not like "*Move-Item*" and CommandLine not like "*Remove-Item*" and CommandLine not like "*logrotate*"

• Scenario: Admin Task for Patch Management
  Description: An admin uses PowerShell to deploy patches via Invoke-Command or Start-Process on remote machines as part of a patching routine.
  Filter/Exclusion: CommandLine not like "*Invoke-Command*" and CommandLine not like "*Start-Process*" and UserAccount not in ("Domain\Administrator", "Domain\Helpdesk")

• Scenario: PowerShell Module for Network Configuration
  Description: A network team uses Set-NetIPInterface or Set-NetAdapter via PowerShell to configure network settings on a Windows server.
  Filter/Exclusion: CommandLine not like "*Set-NetIPInterface*" and CommandLine not like "*Set-NetAdapter*" and ProcessName not in ("powershell.exe", "pwsh.exe")

• Scenario: Script for User Account Management
  Description: A script runs New-LocalUser or Set-LocalUser to manage user accounts during onboarding or offboarding.
  Filter/Exclusion: `CommandLine