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insider-threat-detection-queries (13)

kql MEDIUM Azure-Sentinel
DeviceProcessEvents
huntingmicrosoftofficial
This rule was pulled from an open-source repository and enriched with AI. Validate in a test environment before deploying to production.
View original rule at Azure-Sentinel →
Retrieved: 2026-05-23T03:15:01Z · Confidence: medium

Hunt Hypothesis

Users with administrative privileges accessing sensitive data outside of normal business hours may indicate potential insider threats, as such behavior could signal data exfiltration or unauthorized access. SOC teams should proactively hunt for this behavior in Azure Sentinel to identify and mitigate insider risks before they lead to data breaches or compliance violations.

KQL Query

// --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- //
//
//Use of Suspicious Executable
//
// Replace and extend with any desired .exes
let SuspiciousEXEs = pack_array ("dnscat2.exe", "dnscat.exe");
DeviceProcessEvents
| where ProcessCommandLine has_any (SuspiciousEXEs) or FileName has_any (SuspiciousEXEs)
| project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCommandLine

Analytic Rule Definition

id: daa0abc7-08e6-45d4-86c3-5fd54aab0837
name: insider-threat-detection-queries (13)
description: |
  Intent:
  - Use MTP capability to look for insider threat potential risk indicators
  - Indicators would then serve as the building block for insider threat risk modeling in subsequent tools
  Definition of Insider Threat:
  "The potential for an individual who has or had authorized access to an organization's assets to use their access, either maliciously or unintentionally, to act in a way that could negatively affect the organization."
  This collection of queries describes the different indicators that could be used to model and look for patterns suggesting an increased risk of an individual becoming a potential insider threat.
  Note: no single indicator should be used as a lone determinant of insider threat activity, but should be part of an overall program to understand the increased risk to your organization's critical assets. This in turn is used to feed an investigation by a formal insider threat program to look at the context associated with the whole person to understand the implication of a set of indicators.
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: MicrosoftThreatProtection
  dataTypes:
  - DeviceProcessEvents
tactics:
- Initial access
- Persistence
- Exfiltration
query: |
  // --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- //
  //
  //Use of Suspicious Executable
  //
  // Replace and extend with any desired .exes
  let SuspiciousEXEs = pack_array ("dnscat2.exe", "dnscat.exe");
  DeviceProcessEvents
  | where ProcessCommandLine has_any (SuspiciousEXEs) or FileName has_any (SuspiciousEXEs)
  | project Timestamp, DeviceName, InitiatingProcessFileName, InitiatingProcessParentFileName, ProcessCommandLine, InitiatingProcessCommandLine

Required Data Sources

Sentinel TableNotes
DeviceProcessEventsEnsure this data connector is enabled

MITRE ATT&CK Context

References

False Positive Guidance

Original source: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/main/Hunting Queries/Microsoft 365 Defender/General queries/insider-threat-detection-queries (13).yaml