This rule identifies the presence of InstallShield cabinet archives, which are commonly used by adversaries to package and deploy malicious payloads or legitimate software components during the execution phase. Proactively hunting for these artifacts allows the SOC team to detect potential supply chain compromises or staged deployments that may have been missed by traditional file execution alerts, ensuring visibility into how installers are being utilized within the environment.
rule InstallShield_Cabinet_Archive_Hint_FILE_START: PEiD
{
strings:
$a = { 49 53 63 }
condition:
$a at pe.entry_point
}
This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:
This rule contains 1 string patterns in its detection logic.
setup.exe from a vendor CD or internal share) using the standard Windows msiexec or direct execution, which extracts InstallShield cabinet files (.cab) to the %TEMP% or %LOCALAPPDATA% directory.
C:\Users\<User>\AppData\Local\Temp, C:\Windows\Temp) if the parent process is a known installer executable (e.g., setup.exe, install.exe, msiexec.exe) or if the file extension is .cab and the size is consistent with typical cabinet archives.C:\ProgramData\Adobe\Update, C:\Program Files\Java\jre1.8.0_xxx\temp) created by known update services or processes (e.g., AdobeUpdateService.exe, javaw.exe) within a specific time window after the update service starts..msi or .exe) for troubleshooting or asset inventory purposes.
7z.exe, WinRAR.exe, tar.exe) in user-specific working directories (e.g., C:\Users\<User>\Desktop, C:\Users\<User>\Documents) where the parent process