This detection identifies potential process injection or DLL loading anomalies associated with the specific “IProtect10” signature, which may indicate an adversary attempting to establish persistence by modifying legitimate application behavior. Proactively hunting for this pattern in Azure Sentinel is essential because low-severity signals often represent early-stage reconnaissance or stealthy lateral movement that could escalate into a significant compromise if left uninvestigated.
rule IProtect10FxSubdllmodebyFuXdas
{
meta:
author="malware-lu"
strings:
$a0 = { EB 33 2E 46 55 58 4C 6F 61 64 4C 69 62 72 61 72 79 41 00 46 78 53 75 62 2E 64 6C 6C 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 [3] 00 60 E8 00 00 00 00 5D 81 ED B6 13 40 00 FF 74 24 20 E8 40 00 00 00 0B C0 74 2F 89 85 A8 13 40 00 8D 85 81 13 40 00 50 FF B5 A8 13 40 00 E8 92 00 00 00 0B C0 74 13 89 85 A4 13 40 00 8D 85 8E 13 40 00 50 FF 95 A4 13 40 00 8B 85 AC 13 40 00 89 44 24 1C 61 FF E0 8B 7C 24 04 8D 85 00 10 40 00 50 64 FF 35 00 00 00 00 8D 85 98 13 40 00 89 20 89 68 04 8D 9D 4F 14 40 00 89 58 08 64 89 25 00 00 00 00 81 E7 00 00 FF FF 66 81 3F 4D 5A 75 0F 8B F7 03 76 3C 81 3E 50 45 00 00 75 02 EB 17 81 EF 00 00 01 00 81 FF 00 00 00 70 73 07 BF 00 00 F7 BF EB 02 EB D3 97 64 8F 05 00 00 00 00 83 C4 04 C2 04 00 8D 85 00 10 40 00 50 64 FF 35 00 00 00 00 8D 85 98 13 40 00 89 20 89 68 04 8D 9D 4F 14 40 00 89 58 08 64 89 25 00 00 00 00 8B 74 24 0C 66 81 3E 4D 5A 74 05 E9 8A 00 00 00 03 76 3C 81 3E 50 45 00 00 74 02 EB 7D 8B 7C 24 10 B9 96 00 00 00 32 C0 F2 AE 8B CF 2B 4C 24 10 8B 56 78 03 54 24 0C 8B 5A 20 03 5C 24 0C 33 C0 8B 3B 03 7C 24 0C 8B 74 24 10 51 F3 A6 75 05 83 C4 04 EB 0A 59 83 C3 04 40 3B 42 18 75 E2 3B 42 18 75 02 EB 35 8B 72 24 03 74 24 0C 52 BB 02 00 00 00 33 D2 F7 E3 5A 03 C6 33 C9 66 8B 08 8B 7A 1C 33 D2 BB 04 00 00 00 8B C1 F7 E3 03 44 24 0C 03 C7 8B 00 03 44 24 0C EB 02 33 C0 64 8F 05 00 00 00 00 83 C4 04 C2 08 00 E8 B5 FA FF FF }
condition:
$a0 at pe.entry_point
}
This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:
This rule contains 1 string patterns in its detection logic.
Here are 4 specific false positive scenarios for the IProtect10FxSubdllmodebyFuXdas detection rule, including suggested filters and exclusions tailored for an enterprise environment:
Scenario: Scheduled Endpoint Protection Policy Updates
EsetSvc or IProtectService) dynamically loads sub-modules and injects DLLs into the system memory to verify integrity, triggering the “Subdllmode” detection logic.C:\Program Files\ESET\ESET NOD32 Antivirus\agc.exe) and exclude the process ID range associated with the scheduled task \Microsoft\ESET\Update during the defined maintenance window (e.g., 01:00 – 04:00 UTC).Scenario: Enterprise Software Deployment via SCCM/Intune
ccmsetup.exe or DeviceManagementApp) installs the software and immediately triggers the IProtect engine to scan the newly installed binaries in “sub-DLL mode” before the user logs on. This often involves loading custom DLLs for integration with the AV kernel.ccmsetup.exe, IntuneManagementExtension.exe) and their child processes when they execute within the C:\Windows\CCM or C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Intune Management Extension directories.Scenario: Third-Party Backup Agent Initialization