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Legitimate Application Dropped Script

sigma HIGH SigmaHQ
T1218
imFileEvent
This rule was pulled from an open-source repository and enriched with AI. Validate in a test environment before deploying to production.
View original rule at SigmaHQ →
Retrieved: 2026-03-25T03:05:59Z · Confidence: medium

Hunt Hypothesis

Legitimate applications dropping scripts to disk may indicate adversarial behavior using script-based payloads to execute malicious code. SOC teams should proactively hunt for this behavior in Azure Sentinel to identify potential script-based attacks that bypass traditional defenses.

Detection Rule

Sigma (Original)

title: Legitimate Application Dropped Script
id: 7d604714-e071-49ff-8726-edeb95a70679
status: test
description: Detects programs on a Windows system that should not write scripts to disk
references:
    - https://github.com/Neo23x0/sysmon-config/blob/3f808d9c022c507aae21a9346afba4a59dd533b9/sysmonconfig-export-block.xml#L1326
author: frack113, Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-08-21
modified: 2023-06-22
tags:
    - attack.defense-evasion
    - attack.t1218
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            # Microsoft Office Programs Dropping Executables / Rest of the apps are covered in: c7a74c80-ba5a-486e-9974-ab9e682bc5e4
            - \eqnedt32.exe
            - \wordpad.exe
            - \wordview.exe
            # LOLBINs that can be used to download executables
            - \certutil.exe
            - \certoc.exe
            - \CertReq.exe
            # - \bitsadmin.exe (depends on the environment; comment in if you're sure that bitsadmin doesn't do that in your env)
            - \Desktopimgdownldr.exe
            - \esentutl.exe
            # - \expand.exe
            - '\mshta.exe'
            # Executables that should never drop an executable to disk (but may after a previous process injection or if it's malware that uses a legitimate name)
            - '\AcroRd32.exe'
            - '\RdrCEF.exe'
            - '\hh.exe'
            - '\finger.exe'
        TargetFilename|endswith:
            - '.ps1'
            - '.bat'
            - '.vbs'
            - '.scf'
            - '.wsf'
            - '.wsh'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

KQL (Azure Sentinel)

imFileEvent
| where (TargetFilePath endswith "\\eqnedt32.exe" or TargetFilePath endswith "\\wordpad.exe" or TargetFilePath endswith "\\wordview.exe" or TargetFilePath endswith "\\certutil.exe" or TargetFilePath endswith "\\certoc.exe" or TargetFilePath endswith "\\CertReq.exe" or TargetFilePath endswith "\\Desktopimgdownldr.exe" or TargetFilePath endswith "\\esentutl.exe" or TargetFilePath endswith "\\mshta.exe" or TargetFilePath endswith "\\AcroRd32.exe" or TargetFilePath endswith "\\RdrCEF.exe" or TargetFilePath endswith "\\hh.exe" or TargetFilePath endswith "\\finger.exe") and (TargetFileName endswith ".ps1" or TargetFileName endswith ".bat" or TargetFileName endswith ".vbs" or TargetFileName endswith ".scf" or TargetFileName endswith ".wsf" or TargetFileName endswith ".wsh")

False Positive Guidance

MITRE ATT&CK Context

Original source: https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_susp_legitimate_app_dropping_script.yml