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Load Of RstrtMgr.DLL By A Suspicious Process

sigma HIGH SigmaHQ
T1486T1562.001
DeviceImageLoadEvents
This rule was pulled from an open-source repository and enriched with AI. Validate in a test environment before deploying to production.
View original rule at SigmaHQ →
Retrieved: 2026-03-25T03:05:59Z · Confidence: medium

Hunt Hypothesis

A suspicious process is loading the RstrtMgr.DLL, which is commonly used by ransomware to terminate processes that block file encryption. SOC teams should proactively hunt for this behavior in Azure Sentinel to identify potential ransomware activity and mitigate data loss.

Detection Rule

Sigma (Original)

title: Load Of RstrtMgr.DLL By A Suspicious Process
id: b48492dc-c5ef-4572-8dff-32bc241c15c8
related:
    - id: 3669afd2-9891-4534-a626-e5cf03810a61
      type: derived
status: test
description: |
    Detects the load of RstrtMgr DLL (Restart Manager) by a suspicious process.
    This library has been used during ransomware campaigns to kill processes that would prevent file encryption by locking them (e.g. Conti ransomware, Cactus ransomware). It has also recently been seen used by the BiBi wiper for Windows.
    It could also be used for anti-analysis purposes by shut downing specific processes.
references:
    - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/windows-restart-manager-part-1/
    - https://www.crowdstrike.com/blog/windows-restart-manager-part-2/
    - https://web.archive.org/web/20231221193106/https://www.swascan.com/cactus-ransomware-malware-analysis/
    - https://taiwan.postsen.com/business/88601/Hamas-hackers-use-data-destruction-software-BiBi-which-consumes-a-lot-of-processor-resources-to-wipe-Windows-computer-data--iThome.html
author: Luc Génaux
date: 2023-11-28
tags:
    - attack.impact
    - attack.defense-evasion
    - attack.t1486
    - attack.t1562.001
logsource:
    category: image_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection_img:
        - ImageLoaded|endswith: '\RstrtMgr.dll'
        - OriginalFileName: 'RstrtMgr.dll'
    selection_folders_1:
        Image|contains:
            # Note: increase coverage by adding more suspicious paths
            - ':\Perflogs\'
            - ':\Users\Public\'
            - '\Temporary Internet'
    selection_folders_2:
        - Image|contains|all:
              - ':\Users\'
              - '\Favorites\'
        - Image|contains|all:
              - ':\Users\'
              - '\Favourites\'
        - Image|contains|all:
              - ':\Users\'
              - '\Contacts\'
    condition: selection_img and 1 of selection_folders_*
falsepositives:
    - Processes related to software installation
level: high

KQL (Microsoft 365 Defender)

DeviceImageLoadEvents
| where (FolderPath endswith "\\RstrtMgr.dll" or InitiatingProcessVersionInfoOriginalFileName =~ "RstrtMgr.dll") and ((InitiatingProcessFolderPath contains ":\\Perflogs\\" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath contains ":\\Users\\Public\\" or InitiatingProcessFolderPath contains "\\Temporary Internet") or ((InitiatingProcessFolderPath contains ":\\Users\\" and InitiatingProcessFolderPath contains "\\Favorites\\") or (InitiatingProcessFolderPath contains ":\\Users\\" and InitiatingProcessFolderPath contains "\\Favourites\\") or (InitiatingProcessFolderPath contains ":\\Users\\" and InitiatingProcessFolderPath contains "\\Contacts\\")))

False Positive Guidance

MITRE ATT&CK Context

Original source: https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/image_load/image_load_dll_rstrtmgr_suspicious_load.yml