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Microsoft VBA For Outlook Addin Loaded Via Outlook

sigma MEDIUM SigmaHQ
T1204.002
DeviceImageLoadEvents
This rule was pulled from an open-source repository and enriched with AI. Validate in a test environment before deploying to production.
View original rule at SigmaHQ →
Retrieved: 2026-03-25T03:05:59Z · Confidence: medium

Hunt Hypothesis

The hypothesis is that an adversary is leveraging a malicious Outlook VBA add-in to execute arbitrary code within the victim’s email environment. SOC teams should proactively hunt for this behavior in Azure Sentinel to identify potential compromise of email clients and prevent lateral movement or data exfiltration.

Detection Rule

Sigma (Original)

title: Microsoft VBA For Outlook Addin Loaded Via Outlook
id: 9a0b8719-cd3c-4f0a-90de-765a4cb3f5ed
status: test
description: Detects outlvba (Microsoft VBA for Outlook Addin) DLL being loaded by the outlook process
references:
    - https://speakerdeck.com/heirhabarov/hunting-for-persistence-via-microsoft-exchange-server-or-outlook?slide=58
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-02-08
modified: 2024-03-12
tags:
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1204.002
logsource:
    category: image_load
    product: windows
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith: '\outlook.exe'
        ImageLoaded|endswith: '\outlvba.dll'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Legitimate macro usage. Add the appropriate filter according to your environment
level: medium

KQL (Microsoft 365 Defender)

DeviceImageLoadEvents
| where InitiatingProcessFolderPath endswith "\\outlook.exe" and FolderPath endswith "\\outlvba.dll"

False Positive Guidance

MITRE ATT&CK Context

Original source: https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/image_load/image_load_office_outlook_outlvba_load.yml