Disclosed hacktool set - file cs.exe

Hunt Hypothesis

This detection identifies adversaries deploying the cs.exe hacktool to establish a foothold and potentially execute malicious payloads within the environment. A proactive hunt is essential in Azure Sentinel to uncover hidden persistence mechanisms or command-and-control channels that may evade standard signature-based defenses before they escalate into broader compromises.

YARA Rule

rule MS08_067_Exploit_Hacktools_CN {
	meta:
		description = "Disclosed hacktool set - file cs.exe"
		author = "Florian Roth"
		date = "17.11.14"
		score = 60
		hash = "a3e9e0655447494253a1a60dbc763d9661181322"
	strings:
		$s0 = "MS08-067 Exploit for CN by [email protected]" fullword ascii
		$s3 = "Make SMB Connection error:%d" fullword ascii
		$s5 = "Send Payload Over!" fullword ascii
		$s7 = "Maybe Patched!" fullword ascii
		$s8 = "RpcExceptionCode() = %u" fullword ascii
		$s11 = "ph4nt0m" fullword wide
		$s12 = "\\\\%s\\IPC" ascii
	condition:
		4 of them
}

Deployment Notes

This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:

• Microsoft Defender for Endpoint — Custom indicators / advanced hunting
• Email Gateway — Attachment scanning
• File Share Monitoring — Periodic scanning of shared drives
• YARA CLI — Manual threat hunting on endpoints

This rule contains 7 string patterns in its detection logic.

• Source Rule

False Positive Guidance

Here are 4 specific false positive scenarios for the “Disclosed hacktool set - file cs.exe” detection rule, along with targeted filters to mitigate them:

• Scenario: Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager (SCCM) Client Service

  • Context: The SCCM client service (ccmexec.exe) frequently spawns cs.exe (Configuration Service Provider) during policy updates, software deployments, or inventory scans. This is a standard behavior in enterprise environments managing thousands of endpoints.
  • Filter/Exclusion: Exclude processes where the parent process name is ccmexec.exe and the file path matches %ProgramFiles%\Microsoft Configuration Manager\.

• Scenario: Scheduled Task for System Center Operations Manager (SCOM)

  • Context: SCOM agents often utilize a scheduled task to run health checks or agent updates, spawning cs.exe as part of the “Health Service” component. This typically occurs during business hours when maintenance windows are active.
  • Filter/Exclusion: Create an exclusion for processes launched by the Task Scheduler service (svchost.exe with command line containing \Microsoft\Windows\System Center Operations Manager) where the executable hash matches the known good SCOM agent version.

• Scenario: Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client Updates

  • Context: In many enterprises, the Cisco AnyConnect client uses cs.exe (Cisco Systems) to handle connection state changes or profile updates upon user login. This is a legitimate network access tool often confused with generic hacktools due to the filename similarity.
  • Filter/Exclusion: Filter out instances where the file path contains \Program Files\Cisco\Cisco AnyConnect Secure Mobility Client\ and the publisher is “Cisco Systems, Inc.”

• Scenario: Automated Patching via WSUS or Intune

  • Context: During automated patch