This hypothesis targets the presence of Obsidium software, a known cryptocurrency wallet, which adversaries may deploy to stage stolen digital assets or facilitate off-ramping of funds. Proactively hunting for this specific version allows the SOC to identify potential financial theft or persistence mechanisms before the adversary completes the transfer of assets.
rule Obsidium_V1338_Obsidium_Software: PEiD
{
strings:
$a = { EB 04 ?? ?? ?? ?? E8 28 00 00 00 EB 01 ?? EB 01 ?? 8B 54 24 0C EB 04 ?? ?? ?? ?? 83 82 B8 00 00 00 ?? EB 04 ?? ?? ?? ?? 33 C0 EB 03 ?? ?? ?? C3 EB 01 ?? EB 01 ?? 64 67 FF 36 00 00 EB 03 ?? ?? ?? 64 67 89 26 00 00 EB 02 ?? ?? EB 01 ?? 50 EB 04 ?? ?? ?? ?? 33 C0 EB 02 ?? ?? 8B 00 EB 03 ?? ?? ?? C3 EB 03 ?? ?? ?? E9 FA 00 00 00 EB 03 ?? ?? ?? E8 D5 FF FF FF EB 02 ?? ?? EB 04 ?? ?? ?? ?? 58 EB 04 ?? ?? ?? ?? EB 02 ?? ?? 64 67 8F 06 00 00 EB 04 ?? ?? ?? ?? 83 C4 04 EB 04 ?? ?? ?? ?? E8 57 27 00 00 }
condition:
$a at pe.entry_point
}
This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:
This rule contains 1 string patterns in its detection logic.
Obsidium.exe or ObsidiumUpdater.exe and the file path resides within the standard installation directory (e.g., C:\Program Files\Obsidium\).svchost.exe (specifically the Task Scheduler service) or TaskScheduler.exe, and the command line contains specific Obsidium task identifiers (e.g., --task=nightly_sync).env=dev or env=qa in your CMDB or asset inventory, or exclude file paths containing \dev\, \test\, or \sandbox\.java.exe, node.exe, or specific SaaS client executables) and the file path includes \plugins\ or \integrations\.