This rule targets the presence of Obsidium software, a known tool often utilized by adversaries for data exfiltration or remote access, indicating a potential foothold in the environment. Proactively hunting for this signature in Azure Sentinel allows the SOC team to identify low-severity indicators of compromise early, preventing the software from being leveraged for lateral movement or persistent access before it escalates in impact.
rule Obsidium13037ObsidiumSoftware
{
meta:
author="malware-lu"
strings:
$a0 = { EB 02 [2] E8 26 00 00 00 EB 03 [3] EB 01 ?? 8B 54 24 0C EB 04 [4] 83 82 B8 00 00 00 26 EB 01 ?? 33 C0 EB 02 [2] C3 EB 01 ?? EB 04 [4] 64 67 FF 36 00 00 EB 01 ?? 64 67 89 26 00 00 EB 01 ?? EB 03 [3] 50 EB 03 [3] 33 C0 EB 03 [3] 8B 00 EB 04 [4] C3 EB 03 [3] E9 FA 00 00 00 EB 03 [3] E8 D5 FF FF FF EB 04 [4] EB 01 ?? 58 EB 02 [2] EB 03 [3] 64 67 8F 06 00 00 EB 01 ?? 83 C4 04 EB 03 [3] E8 23 27 00 00 }
condition:
$a0 at pe.entry_point
}
This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:
This rule contains 1 string patterns in its detection logic.
Obsidium software suite (often used for enterprise document management or specific industry verticals) may run a background service or scheduled task that validates license keys or checks for updates. This process can involve writing temporary files to %TEMP% or %APPDATA% that match the YARA signature for the software’s binary or configuration blobs.
ObsidiumService.exe or ObsidiumUpdater.exe, or exclude file paths under C:\Program Files\Obsidium\ and C:\Users\%USERNAME%\AppData\Local\Obsidium\.CCMEXEC.EXE or GPMMSVC.EXE) may extract or stage the Obsidium binaries in temporary directories (C:\Windows\Installer\ or C:\Windows\Temp\) before moving them to the final location. These staged files often retain the original YARA signature.
CCMEXEC.EXE, GPMMSVC.EXE, or MsiExec.exe, and the file path contains \Windows\Installer\ or \Windows\Temp\.C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows Defender\Scans\ or `C:\Program