This hypothesis targets adversaries who obfuscate malicious payloads using PE encryption techniques to evade static analysis, a tactic often employed by advanced threat actors to establish persistent footholds. Proactively hunting for these encrypted executables in Azure Sentinel allows the SOC to identify stealthy malware variants before they execute, reducing the risk of undetected lateral movement or data exfiltration within the environment.
rule PE_Encrypt_10_Liwuyue_additional: PEiD
{
strings:
$a = { 55 8B EC 83 C4 D0 53 56 57 8D 75 FC 8B 44 24 30 25 00 00 FF FF 81 38 4D 5A 90 00 74 07 2D 00 10 00 00 EB F1 89 45 FC E8 C8 FF FF FF 2D 0F 05 00 00 89 45 F4 8B 06 8B 40 3C 03 06 8B 40 78 03 06 8B C8 8B 51 20 03 16 8B 59 24 03 1E 89 5D F0 8B 59 1C 03 1E 89 }
condition:
$a at pe.entry_point
}
This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:
This rule contains 1 string patterns in its detection logic.
C:\Program Files\, C:\Program Files (x86)\) and specific known-good hashes or publisher certificates (e.g., Adobe Inc., Microsoft Corporation). Additionally, whitelist processes like msiexec.exe or setup.exe when the file is being written by a trusted service.C:\ProgramData\CrowdStrike\, C:\Program Files\SentinelOne\) and whitelist the update service executables (e.g., falconctl.exe, sentineloneagent.exe). Ensure the exclusion applies to the file path and the parent process.C:\jenkins\workspace\, C:\AzureDevOps\agent\_work\) and whitelist processes associated with build tools (e.g., dotnet.exe, `