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Potential Startup Shortcut Persistence Via PowerShell.EXE

sigma HIGH SigmaHQ
T1547.001
imFileEvent
This rule was pulled from an open-source repository and enriched with AI. Validate in a test environment before deploying to production.
View original rule at SigmaHQ →
Retrieved: 2026-03-25T03:05:59Z · Confidence: medium

Hunt Hypothesis

Adversaries may use PowerShell to create startup shortcuts as a persistence mechanism, leveraging the technique T1547.001 to ensure persistence across reboots. SOC teams should proactively hunt for this behavior in Azure Sentinel to identify potential long-term access and compromise indicators early.

Detection Rule

Sigma (Original)

title: Potential Startup Shortcut Persistence Via PowerShell.EXE
id: 92fa78e7-4d39-45f1-91a3-8b23f3f1088d
status: test
description: |
    Detects PowerShell writing startup shortcuts.
    This procedure was highlighted in Red Canary Intel Insights Oct. 2021, "We frequently observe adversaries using PowerShell to write malicious .lnk files into the startup directory to establish persistence.
    Accordingly, this detection opportunity is likely to identify persistence mechanisms in multiple threats.
    In the context of Yellow Cockatoo, this persistence mechanism eventually launches the command-line script that leads to the installation of a malicious DLL"
references:
    - https://redcanary.com/blog/intelligence-insights-october-2021/
    - https://github.com/redcanaryco/atomic-red-team/blob/36d49de4c8b00bf36054294b4a1fcbab3917d7c5/atomics/T1547.001/T1547.001.md#atomic-test-7---add-executable-shortcut-link-to-user-startup-folder
author: Christopher Peacock '@securepeacock', SCYTHE
date: 2021-10-24
modified: 2023-02-23
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.t1547.001
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\powershell.exe'
            - '\pwsh.exe'
        TargetFilename|contains: '\start menu\programs\startup\'
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.lnk'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Depending on your environment accepted applications may leverage this at times. It is recommended to search for anomalies inidicative of malware.
level: high

KQL (Azure Sentinel)

imFileEvent
| where (TargetFilePath endswith "\\powershell.exe" or TargetFilePath endswith "\\pwsh.exe") and TargetFileName contains "\\start menu\\programs\\startup\\" and TargetFileName endswith ".lnk"

False Positive Guidance

MITRE ATT&CK Context

Original source: https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_powershell_startup_shortcuts.yml