Detects an executable initiating a network connection to “ngrok” domains. Attackers were seen using this “ngrok” in order to store their second stage payloads and malware. While communication with suc
title: Process Initiated Network Connection To Ngrok Domain
id: 18249279-932f-45e2-b37a-8925f2597670
related:
- id: 1d08ac94-400d-4469-a82f-daee9a908849
type: similar
status: test
description: |
Detects an executable initiating a network connection to "ngrok" domains.
Attackers were seen using this "ngrok" in order to store their second stage payloads and malware.
While communication with such domains can be legitimate, often times is a sign of either data exfiltration by malicious actors or additional download.
references:
- https://ngrok.com/
- https://ngrok.com/blog-post/new-ngrok-domains
- https://www.virustotal.com/gui/file/cca0c1182ac114b44dc52dd2058fcd38611c20bb6b5ad84710681d38212f835a/
- https://www.rnbo.gov.ua/files/2023_YEAR/CYBERCENTER/november/APT29%20attacks%20Embassies%20using%20CVE-2023-38831%20-%20report%20en.pdf
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2022-07-16
modified: 2025-07-30
tags:
- attack.exfiltration
- attack.command-and-control
- attack.t1567
- attack.t1572
- attack.t1102
logsource:
category: network_connection
product: windows
detection:
selection:
Initiated: 'true'
DestinationHostname|endswith:
- '.ngrok-free.app'
- '.ngrok-free.dev'
- '.ngrok.app'
- '.ngrok.dev'
- '.ngrok.io'
condition: selection
falsepositives:
- Legitimate use of the ngrok service.
# Note: The level of this rule is related to your internal policy.
level: high
imNetworkSession
| where NetworkDirection =~ "true" and (DstHostname endswith ".ngrok-free.app" or DstHostname endswith ".ngrok-free.dev" or DstHostname endswith ".ngrok.app" or DstHostname endswith ".ngrok.dev" or DstHostname endswith ".ngrok.io")
| Sentinel Table | Notes |
|---|---|
imNetworkSession | Ensure this data connector is enabled |