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Process Monitor Driver Creation By Non-Sysinternals Binary

sigma MEDIUM SigmaHQ
T1068
imFileEvent
This rule was pulled from an open-source repository and enriched with AI. Validate in a test environment before deploying to production.
View original rule at SigmaHQ →
Retrieved: 2026-03-25T03:05:59Z · Confidence: medium

Hunt Hypothesis

Adversaries may create the Process Monitor driver to persistently monitor system processes and exfiltrate data without detection. SOC teams should proactively hunt for this behavior in Azure Sentinel to identify potential persistence mechanisms used by advanced threats.

Detection Rule

Sigma (Original)

title: Process Monitor Driver Creation By Non-Sysinternals Binary
id: a05baa88-e922-4001-bc4d-8738135f27de
status: test
description: Detects creation of the Process Monitor driver by processes other than Process Monitor (procmon) itself.
references:
    - Internal Research
author: Nasreddine Bencherchali (Nextron Systems)
date: 2023-05-05
tags:
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.t1068
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|contains: '\procmon'
        TargetFilename|endswith: '.sys'
    filter_main_process_explorer:
        Image|endswith:
            - '\procmon.exe'
            - '\procmon64.exe'
    condition: selection and not 1 of filter_main_*
falsepositives:
    - Some false positives may occur with legitimate renamed process monitor binaries
level: medium

KQL (Azure Sentinel)

imFileEvent
| where (TargetFileName contains "\\procmon" and TargetFileName endswith ".sys") and (not((TargetFilePath endswith "\\procmon.exe" or TargetFilePath endswith "\\procmon64.exe")))

False Positive Guidance

MITRE ATT&CK Context

Original source: https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_sysinternals_procmon_driver_susp_creation.yml