This hypothesis targets the execution of unsigned or pseudo-signed binaries associated with the Anorganix family, which adversaries often use to establish initial footholds or execute payloads while evading basic signature-based defenses. Proactively hunting for these specific YARA matches in Azure Sentinel allows the SOC team to identify low-severity anomalies that may indicate early-stage reconnaissance or the deployment of custom tooling before they escalate into more significant compromise activities.
rule PseudoSigner_02_DEF_10_Anorganix: PEiD
{
strings:
$a = { BE 00 01 40 00 6A 05 59 80 7E 07 00 74 11 8B 46 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 83 C1 01 }
condition:
$a at pe.entry_point
}
This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:
This rule contains 1 string patterns in its detection logic.
META-INF/MANIFEST.MF or class files in these JARs if they lack a valid Authenticode signature.
.jar located within standard application server directories (e.g., C:\Program Files\Apache Tomcat\*, C:\opt\jboss\*) or where the parent process is a known Java runtime (java.exe, javaw.exe)..m2\repository, ~/.gradle/caches) often contain unsigned JARs or class files that match the “Anorganix” pattern before the final signing step occurs.
%USERPROFILE%\.m2\*, %USERPROFILE%\.gradle\*) or where the parent process is a build tool (mvn.cmd, gradle.bat, npm.exe)..zip, .tar) that contain unsigned binaries. If the YARA rule scans the contents of these archives or the temporary extraction folders, it may flag legitimate backup data.
backup, archive, or staging (e.g., `C:\Backup