This rule identifies potentially malicious code artifacts associated with the PseudoSigner02CodeSafe20Anorganix signature, which may indicate the presence of unsigned or spoofed binaries used to evade detection. Proactively hunting for these indicators in Azure Sentinel helps identify low-severity threats that could serve as initial footholds for adversaries leveraging code signing anomalies to execute payloads within the environment.
rule PseudoSigner02CodeSafe20Anorganix
{
meta:
author="malware-lu"
strings:
$a0 = { 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 EB 0B 83 EC 10 53 56 57 E8 C4 01 00 85 }
condition:
$a0 at pe.entry_point
}
This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:
This rule contains 1 string patterns in its detection logic.
Scenario: A developer or operations engineer uses CodeSafe (a code signing utility) to sign a custom internal build artifact or a temporary diagnostic script before deploying it to a staging environment. The tool generates a signed binary that matches the PseudoSigner02CodeSafe20Anorganix YARA pattern, triggering the alert on the build server or the developer’s workstation.
codesafe.exe or signcode.exe and the parent process is a build tool (e.g., msbuild.exe, dotnet.exe, npm.exe) or an IDE (e.g., devenv.exe, code.exe). Additionally, whitelist the specific hash of the known-good CodeSafe utility if the YARA rule is overly broad.Scenario: An IT administrator runs a scheduled PowerShell job using Anorganix (a hypothetical or internal naming convention for a specific security patching or configuration management agent) to apply a security update or verify code integrity on a fleet of Windows servers. The agent’s executable or its helper DLLs match the YARA signature during the execution of the scheduled task.
Task Scheduler service (svchost.exe with Tasks parameter) where the command line contains Anorganix or the specific agent name. Alternatively, whitelist the specific executable path (e.g., C:\Program Files\Anorganix\Agent\anorganix_agent.exe) if the YARA rule targets the binary itself.Scenario: A security team performs a manual test of their code signing pipeline using a pseudo-signer utility (a tool that mimics real signing without a certificate) to validate that their detection rules work correctly. This test is run on a dedicated jump host or CI/CD runner,