This hunt hypothesis targets the presence of the RCryptor16cVaka malware family within Azure Sentinel to identify early-stage encryption activities that may precede ransomware deployment. Proactively hunting for this specific YARA signature allows the SOC team to detect low-severity indicators before they escalate into critical incidents, ensuring timely containment and reducing potential data loss.
rule RCryptor16cVaska
{
meta:
author="malware-lu"
strings:
$a0 = { 8B C7 03 04 24 2B C7 80 38 50 0F 85 1B 8B 1F FF 68 [4] B8 [4] 3D [4] 74 06 80 30 ?? 40 EB F3 B8 [4] 3D [4] 74 06 80 30 ?? 40 EB F3 }
condition:
$a0 at pe.entry_point
}
This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:
This rule contains 1 string patterns in its detection logic.
Here are 5 specific false positive scenarios for the RCryptor16cVaska detection rule, along with targeted exclusion strategies:
Scenario: Enterprise Antivirus Real-Time Scanning of Compressed Archives
.zip or .7z archives containing encrypted payloads in real-time. The heuristic behavior of these scanners mimics the encryption routines detected by RCryptor16cVaska.csagent.exe, MsMpEng.exe, or rtvscan64.exe) and the file extension is .zip or .7z.Scenario: Automated Backup Jobs Executing via PowerShell
Backup-Database.ps1) invoke compression and encryption modules. These jobs often spawn child processes that perform block-level encryption similar to the Vaska variant, causing a match on the YARA signature during peak maintenance windows.--backup, -compress, or specific backup tool identifiers, specifically targeting processes running under the SYSTEM or dedicated service accounts.Scenario: Development Build Pipelines in CI/CD Environments