Remote Management and Monitoring tool - GetScreen - Network Connection

Hunt Hypothesis

The hypothesis is that an adversary is using a Remote Management and Monitoring tool to establish a network connection for potential command and control or persistence. SOC teams should proactively hunt for this behavior in Azure Sentinel to identify and mitigate potential C2 channels and persistent threats leveraging legitimate RMM tools.

KQL Query

let Time_start = now(-5d);
let Time_end = now();
//
DeviceNetworkEvents
| where Timestamp between (Time_start..Time_end)
| where RemoteUrl has_any (
        'getscreen.me',
        'getscreen.ru'
    )
    and InitiatingProcessVersionInfoCompanyName has 'getscreen.me'
    and InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductName has 'getscreen.me'
| summarize FirstSeen=min(Timestamp), LastSeen=max(Timestamp), 
    Report=make_set(ReportId), Count=count() by DeviceId, DeviceName,
    RemoteUrl 

Analytic Rule Definition

id: 9c60001c-2118-437b-90f2-d0f899587c3b
name: Remote Management and Monitoring tool - GetScreen - Network Connection
description: |
    Remote Monitoring and Management (RMM) programs are IT to manage remote endpoints. Attackers have begun to abuse these programs to persist or provide C2 channels.
    https://github.com/jischell-msft/RemoteManagementMonitoringTools
requiredDataConnectors:
- connectorId: MicrosoftThreatProtection
  dataTypes:
  - DeviceNetworkEvents
tactics: CommandAndControl
relevantTechniques: T1219
query: |
  let Time_start = now(-5d);
  let Time_end = now();
  //
  DeviceNetworkEvents
  | where Timestamp between (Time_start..Time_end)
  | where RemoteUrl has_any (
          'getscreen.me',
          'getscreen.ru'
      )
      and InitiatingProcessVersionInfoCompanyName has 'getscreen.me'
      and InitiatingProcessVersionInfoProductName has 'getscreen.me'
  | summarize FirstSeen=min(Timestamp), LastSeen=max(Timestamp), 
      Report=make_set(ReportId), Count=count() by DeviceId, DeviceName,
      RemoteUrl 

Required Data Sources

MITRE ATT&CK Context

• Tactic: CommandAndControl
• Technique: T1219 — T1219

References

• [Source Query](https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/main/Hunting Queries/Microsoft 365 Defender/RemoteManagementMonitoring/rmm_GetScreen_netconn.yaml)

False Positive Guidance

• Scenario: Scheduled System Monitoring via RMM Tool
  Description: A legitimate scheduled job runs a remote management tool (e.g., Kaseya VSA, ConnectWise Control) to periodically check system health or monitor network connections.
  Filter/Exclusion: process.name != "GetScreen.exe" or process.parent.name != "RMM_Tool.exe" (e.g., KaseyaVSA.exe or ConnectWiseControl.exe)

• Scenario: Remote Desktop Protocol (RDP) Session via RMM Tool
  Description: An IT admin uses a remote management tool (e.g., ManageEngine ServiceDesk, SolarWinds RMM) to establish an RDP session to a remote endpoint for troubleshooting.
  Filter/Exclusion: process.name != "mstsc.exe" or process.parent.name != "RMM_Tool.exe" (e.g., ServiceDesk.exe or SolarWindsRMM.exe)

• Scenario: Network Connectivity Test via RMM Tool
  Description: A routine network connectivity test is performed using a remote management tool (e.g., BMC BladeLogic, Landesk) to verify network reachability or DNS resolution.
  Filter/Exclusion: process.name != "ping.exe" or process.name != "nslookup.exe" or process.parent.name != "RMM_Tool.exe" (e.g., BladeLogic.exe or Landesk.exe)

• Scenario: Patch Deployment via RMM Tool
  Description: A patching task is initiated through a remote management tool (e.g., Microsoft SCCM, Altiris, N-able N-central) to deploy updates across endpoints.
  Filter/Exclusion: process.name != "msiexec.exe" or process.name != "setup.exe" or