SecurePE 1X wwwdeepzoneorg

Hunt Hypothesis

This rule detects the presence of the SecurePE 1X malware variant, a tool commonly used by threat actors to establish persistence and execute payloads on compromised endpoints. Proactively hunting for this signature in Azure Sentinel allows the SOC to identify stealthy infections that may evade standard behavioral detections, ensuring early containment of low-severity threats before they escalate into lateral movement or data exfiltration.

YARA Rule

rule SecurePE_1X_wwwdeepzoneorg: PEiD
{
    strings:
        $a = { 8B 04 24 E8 00 00 00 00 5D 81 ED 4C 2F 40 00 89 85 61 2F 40 00 8D 9D 65 2F 40 00 53 C3 00 00 00 00 8D B5 BA 2F 40 00 8B FE BB 65 2F 40 00 B9 C6 01 00 00 AD 2B C3 C1 C0 03 33 C3 AB 43 81 FB 8E 2F 40 00 75 05 BB 65 2F 40 00 E2 E7 89 AD 1A 31 40 00 89 AD 55 34 40 00 89 AD 68 34 40 00 8D 85 BA 2F 40 00 50 C3 }
    condition:
        $a at pe.entry_point

}

Deployment Notes

This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:

• Microsoft Defender for Endpoint — Custom indicators / advanced hunting
• Email Gateway — Attachment scanning
• File Share Monitoring — Periodic scanning of shared drives
• YARA CLI — Manual threat hunting on endpoints

This rule contains 1 string patterns in its detection logic.

• Source Rule

False Positive Guidance

• Scenario: A developer or DevOps engineer uses a legitimate, open-source utility or a custom internal tool that is digitally signed by a vendor whose certificate chain or metadata inadvertently matches the wwwdeepzoneorg pattern (e.g., a specific version of a C/C++ compiler wrapper, a memory dump analyzer, or a niche network diagnostic tool).

  • Filter/Exclusion: Exclude processes where the parent process is a known IDE (e.g., code.exe, devenv.exe, idea64.exe) or a build system (msbuild.exe, dotnet.exe, make.exe), or whitelist the specific executable path if the tool is standard in the development environment.

• Scenario: An automated backup or log rotation script (e.g., using robocopy, rsync, or a custom PowerShell script) copies a binary file that was previously flagged or is a known benign utility (like a specific version of 7z.exe, tar.exe, or a proprietary agent) to a network share or backup destination, triggering the YARA rule on the file copy operation.

  • Filter/Exclusion: Exclude events where the destination path is a known backup share (e.g., \\fileserver\backups\, /var/backups/) or where the source process is a standard file transfer utility (robocopy.exe, rsync, scp, powershell.exe running a copy command).

• Scenario: A security scanner or vulnerability assessment tool (e.g., Nessus, Qualys, or a custom internal scanner) executes a small, signed probe or agent binary to test endpoint detection capabilities or to collect system information. This binary may be a generic stub that matches the YARA signature.

  • Filter/Exclusion: Exclude processes where the parent process is a known security management console or agent (e.g., `ness