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Service Principal Assigned Privileged Role

kql MEDIUM Azure-Sentinel
T1078.004
AuditLogs
backdoormicrosoftofficial
This rule was pulled from an open-source repository and enriched with AI. Validate in a test environment before deploying to production.
View original rule at Azure-Sentinel →
Retrieved: 2026-03-25T03:06:09Z · Confidence: medium

Hunt Hypothesis

Service Principals being assigned privileged roles may indicate an adversary attempting to escalate privileges or maintain persistence within the environment. SOC teams should proactively hunt for this behavior in Azure Sentinel to identify and mitigate potential unauthorized access or lateral movement tactics.

KQL Query

AuditLogs
  | where OperationName has_all ("member to role", "add")
  | where Result =~ "Success"
  | extend type_ = tostring(TargetResources[0].type)
  | where type_ =~ "ServicePrincipal"
  | where isnotempty(TargetResources)
  | extend InitiatingAppName = tostring(InitiatedBy.app.displayName)
  | extend InitiatingAppServicePrincipalId = tostring(InitiatedBy.app.servicePrincipalId)
  | extend InitiatingUserPrincipalName = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName)
  | extend InitiatingAadUserId = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.id)
  | extend InitiatingIPAddress = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.ipAddress)
  | extend InitiatedBy = tostring(iff(isnotempty(InitiatingUserPrincipalName),InitiatingUserPrincipalName, InitiatingAppName))
  | extend ServicePrincipalName = tostring(TargetResources[0].displayName)
  | extend ServicePrincipalId = tostring(TargetResources[0].id)
  | mv-expand TargetResources[0].modifiedProperties
  | extend TargetResources_0_modifiedProperties = columnifexists("TargetResources_0_modifiedProperties", '')
  | where isnotempty(TargetResources_0_modifiedProperties)
  | extend displayName = tostring(TargetResources_0_modifiedProperties.displayName), newValue = tostring(parse_json(tostring(TargetResources_0_modifiedProperties.newValue)))
  | where displayName == "Role.DisplayName" and newValue contains "admin"
  | extend InitiatingAccountName = tostring(split(InitiatingUserPrincipalName, "@")[0]), InitiatingAccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(InitiatingUserPrincipalName, "@")[1])
  | extend TargetRole = newValue
  | project-reorder TimeGenerated, ServicePrincipalName, ServicePrincipalId, InitiatedBy, TargetRole, InitiatingIPAddress

Analytic Rule Definition

id: 84cccc86-5c11-4b3a-aca6-7c8f738ed0f7
name: Service Principal Assigned Privileged Role
description: |
  'Detects a privileged role being added to a Service Principal.
    Ensure that any assignment to a Service Principal is valid and appropriate - Service Principals should not be assigned to very highly privileged roles such as Global Admin.
    Ref: https://docs.microsoft.com/azure/active-directory/fundamentals/security-operations-privileged-accounts#changes-to-privileged-accounts'
severity: Medium
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: AzureActiveDirectory
    dataTypes:
      - AuditLogs
queryFrequency: 1d
queryPeriod: 1d
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - PrivilegeEscalation
relevantTechniques:
  - T1078.004
tags:
  - AADSecOpsGuide
query: |
  AuditLogs
    | where OperationName has_all ("member to role", "add")
    | where Result =~ "Success"
    | extend type_ = tostring(TargetResources[0].type)
    | where type_ =~ "ServicePrincipal"
    | where isnotempty(TargetResources)
    | extend InitiatingAppName = tostring(InitiatedBy.app.displayName)
    | extend InitiatingAppServicePrincipalId = tostring(InitiatedBy.app.servicePrincipalId)
    | extend InitiatingUserPrincipalName = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.userPrincipalName)
    | extend InitiatingAadUserId = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.id)
    | extend InitiatingIPAddress = tostring(InitiatedBy.user.ipAddress)
    | extend InitiatedBy = tostring(iff(isnotempty(InitiatingUserPrincipalName),InitiatingUserPrincipalName, InitiatingAppName))
    | extend ServicePrincipalName = tostring(TargetResources[0].displayName)
    | extend ServicePrincipalId = tostring(TargetResources[0].id)
    | mv-expand TargetResources[0].modifiedProperties
    | extend TargetResources_0_modifiedProperties = columnifexists("TargetResources_0_modifiedProperties", '')
    | where isnotempty(TargetResources_0_modifiedProperties)
    | extend displayName = tostring(TargetResources_0_modifiedProperties.displayName), newValue = tostring(parse_json(tostring(TargetResources_0_modifiedProperties.newValue)))
    | where displayName == "Role.DisplayName" and newValue contains "admin"
    | extend InitiatingAccountName = tostring(split(InitiatingUserPrincipalName, "@")[0]), InitiatingAccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(InitiatingUserPrincipalName, "@")[1])
    | extend TargetRole = newValue
    | project-reorder TimeGenerated, ServicePrincipalName, ServicePrincipalId, InitiatedBy, TargetRole, InitiatingIPAddress
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: InitiatingAppName
      - identifier: AadUserId
        columnName: InitiatingAppServicePrincipalId
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: FullName
        columnName: InitiatingUserPrincipalName
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: InitiatingAccountName
      - identifier: UPNSuffix
        columnName: InitiatingAccountUPNSuffix
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
 

Required Data Sources

Sentinel TableNotes
AuditLogsEnsure this data connector is enabled

MITRE ATT&CK Context

References

False Positive Guidance

Original source: https://github.com/Azure/Azure-Sentinel/blob/main/Detections/AuditLogs/ServicePrincipalAssignedPrivilegedRole.yaml