Disclosed hacktool set (old stuff) - file hunt.exe

Hunt Hypothesis

This detection identifies adversaries deploying legacy or known hacking tools, specifically the hunt.exe executable, which may indicate reconnaissance activities or the use of established attack frameworks within the environment. A proactive hunt is essential in Azure Sentinel to distinguish between benign administrative usage and malicious execution that could serve as a precursor to lateral movement or data exfiltration campaigns.

YARA Rule

rule sig_238_hunt {
	meta:
		description = "Disclosed hacktool set (old stuff) - file hunt.exe"
		author = "Florian Roth"
		date = "23.11.14"
		score = 60
		hash = "f9f059380d95c7f8d26152b1cb361d93492077ca"
	strings:
		$s1 = "Programming by JD Glaser - All Rights Reserved" fullword ascii
		$s3 = "Usage - hunt \\\\servername" fullword ascii
		$s4 = ".share = %S - %S" fullword wide
		$s5 = "SMB share enumerator and admin finder " fullword ascii
		$s7 = "Hunt only runs on Windows NT..." fullword ascii
		$s8 = "User = %S" fullword ascii
		$s9 = "Admin is %s\\%s" fullword ascii
	condition:
		all of them
}

Deployment Notes

This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:

• Microsoft Defender for Endpoint — Custom indicators / advanced hunting
• Email Gateway — Attachment scanning
• File Share Monitoring — Periodic scanning of shared drives
• YARA CLI — Manual threat hunting on endpoints

This rule contains 7 string patterns in its detection logic.

• Source Rule

False Positive Guidance

Here are 5 specific false positive scenarios for the Disclosed hacktool set (old stuff) - file hunt.exe detection rule, along with recommended filters and exclusions:

• Scenario: Scheduled Endpoint Protection Scans

  • Context: Enterprise endpoint protection suites like CrowdStrike Falcon, Carbon Black, or Symantec Endpoint Protection often utilize a legacy component named hunt.exe (or similar) to perform scheduled deep-dive scans of the file system for known threats. This process is triggered automatically by the OS scheduler during off-hours.
  • Filter/Exclusion: Create an exclusion based on the Process Image Path. Exclude any execution where the path contains \Program Files\CrowdStrike\FalconCore\ (or equivalent vendor paths) and the parent process is falcon.sys, Symantec.exe, or the Windows Task Scheduler (svchost.exe -k netsvcs).

• Scenario: Legacy Asset Inventory & Discovery Tools

  • Context: IT operations teams frequently deploy legacy asset management tools such as SolarWinds RMM, LanDesk, or custom internal scripts to inventory hardware and software. These agents often run a discovery module named hunt.exe that enumerates installed applications, registry keys, and network configurations on workstations.
  • Filter/Exclusion: Filter by User Context. Exclude events where the process is running under the context of a known service account (e.g., DOMAIN\svc-asset-inventory) or a local system account (NT SYSTEM), specifically when the file hash matches the known good hash of the deployed agent version.

• Scenario: Automated Patch Deployment & Compliance Checks

  • Context: During monthly patch cycles, tools like Microsoft SCCM (Configuration Manager) or Ivanti Neurons execute pre-deployment validation scripts. These