Disclosed hacktool set (old stuff) - file token.exe

Hunt Hypothesis

This detection identifies adversaries deploying legacy or repurposed hacking tools, specifically token.exe, which often indicate credential theft or lateral movement activities within the environment. Proactively hunting for this behavior in Azure Sentinel is critical to uncover stealthy threats that may evade standard signature-based defenses by masquerading as benign, older utilities while executing malicious token manipulation tasks.

YARA Rule

rule sig_238_token {
	meta:
		description = "Disclosed hacktool set (old stuff) - file token.exe"
		author = "Florian Roth"
		date = "23.11.14"
		score = 60
		hash = "c52bc6543d4281aa75a3e6e2da33cfb4b7c34b14"
	strings:
		$s0 = "Logon.exe" fullword ascii
		$s1 = "Domain And User:" fullword ascii
		$s2 = "PID=Get Addr$(): One" fullword ascii
		$s3 = "Process " fullword ascii
		$s4 = "psapi.dllK" fullword ascii
	condition:
		all of them
}

Deployment Notes

This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:

• Microsoft Defender for Endpoint — Custom indicators / advanced hunting
• Email Gateway — Attachment scanning
• File Share Monitoring — Periodic scanning of shared drives
• YARA CLI — Manual threat hunting on endpoints

This rule contains 5 string patterns in its detection logic.

• Source Rule

False Positive Guidance

Here are 5 specific false positive scenarios for the Disclosed hacktool set (old stuff) - file token.exe detection rule, along with suggested filters and exclusions:

• Scenario: Microsoft Endpoint Configuration Manager (SCCM/MECM) Deployment

  • Context: The SCCM client service (ccmexec.exe) frequently deploys legacy update agents or custom maintenance scripts that spawn a helper process named token.exe to handle authentication tokens during software installation. This often occurs during the nightly “Maintenance Window.”
  • Suggested Filter/Exclusion: Exclude processes where the parent executable is C:\Windows\CCM\ccmexec.exe and the file path resides within C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft Configuration Manager\.

• Scenario: Legacy Active Directory Password Reset Tool

  • Context: Many enterprises utilize a custom or third-party legacy tool for bulk password resets or token generation (e.g., an older version of “TokenManager” or a script wrapper) that runs as a scheduled task. This tool creates token.exe to process user credentials before the main application starts.
  • Suggested Filter/Exclusion: Create an exclusion based on the Scheduled Task name Microsoft\Windows\PasswordResetService or filter events where the command line contains arguments like /mode=reset and the file hash matches a known baseline (e.g., SHA256: a1b2c3...).

• Scenario: Virtual Desktop Infrastructure (VDI) Session Initialization

  • Context: In Citrix or VMware Horizon environments, the session broker often launches token.exe as part of the “old stuff” initialization layer to manage user session tokens and license validation before launching the desktop shell. This is common in older VDI builds that haven’t been fully migrated to newer agents.

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