This hunt targets adversaries leveraging Rich Text Format (RTF) email attachments that trigger the download of external resources, a technique often used to establish initial footholds or exfiltrate data without direct file execution. Proactively hunting for this pattern in Azure Sentinel is critical because such behavior frequently indicates early-stage phishing campaigns designed to bypass traditional signature-based defenses by exploiting legitimate system processes during resource retrieval.
rule SUSP_Doc_RTF_OLE2Link_EMAIL_Jun22 {
meta:
description = "Detects a suspicious pattern in RTF files which downloads external resources inside e-mail attachments"
author = "Christian Burkard"
date = "2022-06-01"
reference = "Internal Research"
hash = "4abc20e5130b59639e20bd6b8ad759af18eb284f46e99a5cc6b4f16f09456a68"
score = 75
id = "48cde505-3ce4-52ef-b338-0c08ac4f63de"
strings:
/* \objdata" */
$sa1 = "XG9iamRhdG" ascii
$sa2 = "xvYmpkYXRh" ascii
$sa3 = "cb2JqZGF0Y" ascii
/* OLE2Link */
$sb1 = "NGY0YzQ1MzI0YzY5NmU2Y" ascii
$sb2 = "RmNGM0NTMyNGM2OTZlNm" ascii
$sb3 = "0ZjRjNDUzMjRjNjk2ZTZi" ascii
$sb4 = "NEY0QzQ1MzI0QzY5NkU2Q" ascii
$sb5 = "RGNEM0NTMyNEM2OTZFNk" ascii
$sb6 = "0RjRDNDUzMjRDNjk2RTZC" ascii
/* docfile magic - doc file albilae */
$sc1 = "ZDBjZjExZTBhMWIxMWFlM" ascii
$sc2 = "QwY2YxMWUwYTFiMTFhZT" ascii
$sc3 = "kMGNmMTFlMGExYjExYWUx" ascii
$sc4 = "RDBDRjExRTBBMUIxMUFFM" ascii
$sc5 = "QwQ0YxMUUwQTFCMTFBRT" ascii
$sc6 = "EMENGMTFFMEExQjExQUUx" ascii
/* http:// */
$x1 = "NjgwMDc0MDA3NDAwNzAwMDNhMDAyZjAwMmYwM" ascii
$x2 = "Y4MDA3NDAwNzQwMDcwMDAzYTAwMmYwMDJmMD" ascii
$x3 = "2ODAwNzQwMDc0MDA3MDAwM2EwMDJmMDAyZjAw" ascii
$x4 = "NjgwMDc0MDA3NDAwNzAwMDNBMDAyRjAwMkYwM" ascii
$x5 = "Y4MDA3NDAwNzQwMDcwMDAzQTAwMkYwMDJGMD" ascii
$x6 = "2ODAwNzQwMDc0MDA3MDAwM0EwMDJGMDAyRjAw" ascii
/* https:// */
$x7 = "NjgwMDc0MDA3NDAwNzAwMDczMDAzYTAwMmYwMDJmMD" ascii
$x8 = "Y4MDA3NDAwNzQwMDcwMDA3MzAwM2EwMDJmMDAyZjAw" ascii
$x9 = "2ODAwNzQwMDc0MDA3MDAwNzMwMDNhMDAyZjAwMmYwM" ascii
$x10 = "NjgwMDc0MDA3NDAwNzAwMDczMDAzQTAwMkYwMDJGMD" ascii
$x11 = "Y4MDA3NDAwNzQwMDcwMDA3MzAwM0EwMDJGMDAyRjAw" ascii
$x12 = "2ODAwNzQwMDc0MDA3MDAwNzMwMDNBMDAyRjAwMkYwM" ascii
/* ftp:// */
$x13 = "NjYwMDc0MDA3MDAwM2EwMDJmMDAyZjAw" ascii
$x14 = "Y2MDA3NDAwNzAwMDNhMDAyZjAwMmYwM" ascii
$x15 = "2NjAwNzQwMDcwMDAzYTAwMmYwMDJmMD" ascii
$x16 = "NjYwMDc0MDA3MDAwM0EwMDJGMDAyRjAw" ascii
$x17 = "Y2MDA3NDAwNzAwMDNBMDAyRjAwMkYwM" ascii
$x18 = "2NjAwNzQwMDcwMDAzQTAwMkYwMDJGMD" ascii
/* TODO: more protocols */
condition:
filesize < 10MB
and 1 of ($sa*)
and 1 of ($sb*)
and 1 of ($sc*)
and 1 of ($x*)
}
This YARA rule can be deployed in the following contexts:
This rule contains 33 string patterns in its detection logic.
Here are 4 specific false positive scenarios for the rule “Detects a suspicious pattern in RTF files which downloads external resources inside e-mail attachments”, including suggested filters and exclusions:
Scenario: Automated Report Distribution via Microsoft Power BI
.rtf documents containing embedded charts that reference high-resolution images hosted on the internal Azure Blob Storage or SharePoint CDN. When these emails are opened by recipients, the RTF renderer fetches these external assets.*.sharepoint.com or *.azurewebsites.net). Additionally, exclude traffic originating from the internal Power BI Service account (PowerBI-Service) where the destination IP falls within the corporate intranet range.Scenario: Legal Document Review using Adobe Acrobat Pro
https://dms.internal.corp.com/assets/*) and the user group is Legal-Reviewers.Scenario: Scheduled HR Onboarding Packets