Suspicious Login from deleted guest account

Hunt Hypothesis

Adversaries may reuse deleted guest accounts to gain unauthorized access to Azure resources, leveraging the persistence of old credentials. SOC teams should proactively hunt for this behavior to identify potential credential reuse and prevent lateral movement or data exfiltration.

KQL Query

let query_frequency = 1h;
let query_period = 1d;
AuditLogs
| where TimeGenerated > ago(query_frequency)
| where Category =~ "UserManagement" and OperationName =~ "Delete user"
| mv-expand TargetResource = TargetResources
| where TargetResource["type"] == "User" and TargetResource["userPrincipalName"] has "#EXT#"
| extend ParsedDeletedUserPrincipalName = extract(@"^[0-9a-f]{32}([^\#]+)\#EXT\#", 1, tostring(TargetResource["userPrincipalName"]))
| extend
    Initiator = iif(isnotempty(InitiatedBy["app"]), tostring(InitiatedBy["app"]["displayName"]), tostring(InitiatedBy["user"]["userPrincipalName"])),
    InitiatorId = iif(isnotempty(InitiatedBy["app"]), tostring(InitiatedBy["app"]["servicePrincipalId"]), tostring(InitiatedBy["user"]["id"])),
    Delete_IPAddress = tostring(InitiatedBy[tostring(bag_keys(InitiatedBy)[0])]["ipAddress"])
| project Delete_TimeGenerated = TimeGenerated, Category, Identity, Initiator, Delete_IPAddress, OperationName, Result, ParsedDeletedUserPrincipalName, InitiatedBy, AdditionalDetails, TargetResources, InitiatorId, CorrelationId
| join kind=inner (
    SigninLogs
    | where TimeGenerated > ago(query_period)
    | where ResultType == 0
    | summarize take_any(*) by UserPrincipalName
    | extend ParsedUserPrincipalName = translate("@", "_", UserPrincipalName)
    | project SigninLogs_TimeGenerated = TimeGenerated, UserPrincipalName, UserDisplayName, ResultType, ResultDescription, IPAddress, LocationDetails, AppDisplayName, ResourceDisplayName, ClientAppUsed, UserAgent, DeviceDetail, UserId, UserType, OriginalRequestId, ParsedUserPrincipalName
    ) on $left.ParsedDeletedUserPrincipalName == $right.ParsedUserPrincipalName
| where SigninLogs_TimeGenerated > Delete_TimeGenerated
| project-away ParsedDeletedUserPrincipalName, ParsedUserPrincipalName
| extend
    AccountName = tostring(split(UserPrincipalName, "@")[0]),
    AccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(UserPrincipalName, "@")[1])

Analytic Rule Definition

id: defe4855-0d33-4362-9557-009237623976
name: Suspicious Login from deleted guest account
description: |
  ' This query will detect logins from guest account which was recently deleted. 
  For any successful logins from deleted identities should be investigated further if any existing user accounts have been altered or linked to such identity prior deletion'
severity: Medium
requiredDataConnectors:
  - connectorId: AzureActiveDirectory
    dataTypes:
      - AuditLogs
  - connectorId: AzureActiveDirectory
    dataTypes:
      - SigninLogs
queryFrequency: 1h
queryPeriod: 1d
triggerOperator: gt
triggerThreshold: 0
tactics:
  - PrivilegeEscalation
relevantTechniques:
  - T1078.004
tags:
  - GuestorExternalIdentities
query: |
  let query_frequency = 1h;
  let query_period = 1d;
  AuditLogs
  | where TimeGenerated > ago(query_frequency)
  | where Category =~ "UserManagement" and OperationName =~ "Delete user"
  | mv-expand TargetResource = TargetResources
  | where TargetResource["type"] == "User" and TargetResource["userPrincipalName"] has "#EXT#"
  | extend ParsedDeletedUserPrincipalName = extract(@"^[0-9a-f]{32}([^\#]+)\#EXT\#", 1, tostring(TargetResource["userPrincipalName"]))
  | extend
      Initiator = iif(isnotempty(InitiatedBy["app"]), tostring(InitiatedBy["app"]["displayName"]), tostring(InitiatedBy["user"]["userPrincipalName"])),
      InitiatorId = iif(isnotempty(InitiatedBy["app"]), tostring(InitiatedBy["app"]["servicePrincipalId"]), tostring(InitiatedBy["user"]["id"])),
      Delete_IPAddress = tostring(InitiatedBy[tostring(bag_keys(InitiatedBy)[0])]["ipAddress"])
  | project Delete_TimeGenerated = TimeGenerated, Category, Identity, Initiator, Delete_IPAddress, OperationName, Result, ParsedDeletedUserPrincipalName, InitiatedBy, AdditionalDetails, TargetResources, InitiatorId, CorrelationId
  | join kind=inner (
      SigninLogs
      | where TimeGenerated > ago(query_period)
      | where ResultType == 0
      | summarize take_any(*) by UserPrincipalName
      | extend ParsedUserPrincipalName = translate("@", "_", UserPrincipalName)
      | project SigninLogs_TimeGenerated = TimeGenerated, UserPrincipalName, UserDisplayName, ResultType, ResultDescription, IPAddress, LocationDetails, AppDisplayName, ResourceDisplayName, ClientAppUsed, UserAgent, DeviceDetail, UserId, UserType, OriginalRequestId, ParsedUserPrincipalName
      ) on $left.ParsedDeletedUserPrincipalName == $right.ParsedUserPrincipalName
  | where SigninLogs_TimeGenerated > Delete_TimeGenerated
  | project-away ParsedDeletedUserPrincipalName, ParsedUserPrincipalName
  | extend
      AccountName = tostring(split(UserPrincipalName, "@")[0]),
      AccountUPNSuffix = tostring(split(UserPrincipalName, "@")[1])
entityMappings:
  - entityType: Account
    fieldMappings:
      - identifier: FullName
        columnName: UserPrincipalName
      - identifier: Name
        columnName: AccountName
      - identifier: UPNSuffix
        columnName: AccountUPNSuffix
  - entityType: IP
    f

Required Data Sources

MITRE ATT&CK Context

• Tactic: PrivilegeEscalation
• Technique: T1078.004 — T1078.004

References

• Source Query

False Positive Guidance

• Scenario: Scheduled Job Using a Deleted Guest Account
  Description: A legacy scheduled job or script may still be using a deleted guest account for automated tasks.
  Filter/Exclusion: Exclude logins originating from system services or scheduled tasks (e.g., task scheduler, cron, or systemd jobs) using the process.name or process.parent fields. Example: process.name:"task scheduler" or process.parent:"systemd"

• Scenario: Backup or Sync Tool Using a Deleted Guest Account
  Description: A backup or sync tool (e.g., Veeam, rsync, or SyncToy) may have been configured to use a deleted guest account for data transfer.
  Filter/Exclusion: Exclude logins associated with backup tools by checking the process.name or event.device fields. Example: process.name:"rsync" or event.device:"backup"

• Scenario: Admin Task or Maintenance Script
  Description: An admin may have created a temporary guest account for maintenance tasks, which was later deleted but still used in a script or task.
  Filter/Exclusion: Exclude logins with user.domain or user.account fields that match known admin accounts or temporary accounts. Example: user.account:"admin_temp" or user.domain:"internal"

• Scenario: Legacy Application or Service Using a Deleted Guest Account
  Description: An old application or service (e.g., SQL Server, Exchange, or IIS) may still be using a deleted guest account for service authentication.
  Filter/Exclusion: Exclude logins where the source.ip is from a known internal service IP range or where the process.name matches a known service. Example: source.ip:192.168.0.0/16