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Suspicious Scheduled Task Write to System32 Tasks

sigma HIGH SigmaHQ
T1053
imFileEvent
This rule was pulled from an open-source repository and enriched with AI. Validate in a test environment before deploying to production.
View original rule at SigmaHQ →
Retrieved: 2026-03-25T03:05:59Z · Confidence: medium

Hunt Hypothesis

Adversaries may use scheduled tasks in System32 to execute persistence or lateral movement by leveraging trusted execution environments. SOC teams should proactively hunt for this behavior as it indicates potential compromise and unauthorized process execution in critical system directories.

Detection Rule

Sigma (Original)

title: Suspicious Scheduled Task Write to System32 Tasks
id: 80e1f67a-4596-4351-98f5-a9c3efabac95
status: test
description: Detects the creation of tasks from processes executed from suspicious locations
references:
    - Internal Research
author: Florian Roth (Nextron Systems)
date: 2021-11-16
modified: 2022-01-12
tags:
    - attack.privilege-escalation
    - attack.persistence
    - attack.execution
    - attack.t1053
logsource:
    product: windows
    category: file_event
detection:
    selection:
        TargetFilename|contains: '\Windows\System32\Tasks'
        Image|contains:
            - '\AppData\'
            - 'C:\PerfLogs'
            - '\Windows\System32\config\systemprofile'
    condition: selection
falsepositives:
    - Unknown
level: high

KQL (Azure Sentinel)

imFileEvent
| where TargetFileName contains "\\Windows\\System32\\Tasks" and (TargetFilePath contains "\\AppData\\" or TargetFilePath contains "C:\\PerfLogs" or TargetFilePath contains "\\Windows\\System32\\config\\systemprofile")

False Positive Guidance

MITRE ATT&CK Context

Original source: https://github.com/SigmaHQ/sigma/blob/master/rules/windows/file/file_event/file_event_win_susp_task_write.yml